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Chris Loughran and Djadranka Gillesen (MAG, Mines 
Advisory Group) take stock of MAG’s armed manage-
ment and destruction programming, based on lessons 
learned over the past two years.
Our Spotlight is on Eastern Europe and Caucuses, 
specifically disaster response planning. Abigail Jones 
and Edward Crowther (Danish Demining Group/
Danish Refugee Council) discuss the provision of emer-
gency risk education to internally displaced persons 
and returnees in Ukraine, and Dr. Darvin Lisica and 
Dr. Stuart Maslen (Norwegian People’s Aid) discuss the 
continued need for clearance work in Kosovo. Finally, 
Faiz Paktian from GICHD reviews the organization’s 
Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia Outreach 
Programme. 
As we reflect on The Journal’s evolution through 
these past twenty years, we would like to take this op-
portunity to extend our gratitude to our contribut-
ing authors, peer reviewers, and of course, our readers 
around the globe. We would not be where we are today 
without you. Thank you for contributing, for review-
ing and for reading The Journal throughout the years. 
As you may note, this edition features articles repre-
sented by a number of industry experts and interna-
tional organizations working in the field. Programs are 
reviewed, successes are discussed along with failures, 
and current practices are brought into question. This 
is the role of The Journal; to act as a medium through 
which to explore differing viewpoints, as well as an in-
formation source and sounding board for the field of 
mine action and conventional weapons destruction. As 
we move into our twentieth year, I encourage you to 
reach out to us with topics you would like to see covered 
in future issues. The Journal is an information source 
for us all, both in print and online, and we encourage 
our authors and readers to continue utilizing this great 
resource available to our community of practice. Visit 
us online at www.jmu.edu/cisr 
Welcome to our 20th edition of The Journal! 
This is an exciting year for us as we celebrate the twentieth 
anniversary of the Center for International Stabilization 
and Recovery (CISR) as well as The Journal. Since our 
founding in 1996, CISR’s mission, programs and pub-
lications have continuously evolved with the ever- 
changing face of mine action, reflecting the training, 
informational and program needs of the field. As mine 
action is absorbed into the broader scope of convention-
al weapons destruction, CISR and The Journal are pre-
pared to be the information leader for this community 
of practice. With great anticipation we begin this edition 
of The Journal with a new design and title—The Journal 
of Conventional Weapons Destruction.
We begin our twentieth edition with an editorial 
from Russell Gasser, in which he questions the bene-
fits of large-scale spending on research into new tech-
nologies, especially when funding to develop and share 
solutions based on existing technology is sparse. We en-
courage readers to share their thoughts with us.
In our Feature section we look at best practices in 
conventional weapons destruction. Marlene Dupouy 
and Charles Frisby (UNMAS) review UNMAS’s stock-
pile destruction of obsolete surface-to-air missiles pro-
gram in Mali, and Mark Frankish (UNMAS) reports 
on the UNMAS Gaza Emergency Response in 2014. 
Chad Clifton (Sterling International Group, LLC) dis-
cusses the use of thermal treatment to destroy large 
caliber ammunition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while 
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improving lives since 1996.
 » (Above left) The cover of our very first printed edition of The Journal in 
Fall 1999 after three volumes of online-only publication. CISR Director, Ken 
Rutherford is in the upper left hand corner with Queen Noor of Jordan and 
Jerry White, co-founder of Landmine Survivor’s Network (Survivor Corps).
 » (Above right) The Journal changed its name from The Journal of Mine Action 
to The Journal of ERW and Mine Action with Issue 12.2 in Winter 2008-09.
 » (Right) Commemorative coins were produced in 2001 to celebrate our relation-
ship with James Madison University. In 2008, the Mine Action Information Center 
was renamed The Center for International Stabilization and Recovery. 
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Editorial
Technology Research in Mine Action:  
Enough is Enough
by Russell Gasser
Twenty years ago I started work on a doc-torate thesis asking the question: “Why has research into new technologies for 
mine action had so little success?”1 My research 
discovered that about one billion dollars had 
been spent by the year 2000 on fundamental and 
applied research to produce new technologies 
to solve the mine problem.1 The resulting ben-
efit for humanitarian mine action was indeed 
very small. Since then, large-scale spending has 
continued with limited success. Researchers and 
their funders have not learned from continued, 
expensive failure. There is clear cause and effect 
at work, which means that many research proj-
ects and programs have followed a similar route 
to failure.
New technology has an important role in 
making mine action faster, safer, cheaper, or 
some useful combination of these three. Major 
gains to safety and/or productivity have result-
ed from the use of satellite and cell phones, GPS, 
digital cameras, laptops and tablet computers, 
map plotters, Google Earth mapping, polycar-
bonate for visors and Kevlar for protective vests 
and much more. However, none of these gains 
came from research into new technologies for 
mine action, they all came from adapting and ap-
plying useful, off-the-shelf products. These prod-
ucts could afford the high cost of research and 
development as they had a large-scale market.
Mutual misunderstanding between re-
searchers and demining organizations began in 
the early 1990s when research into mine action 
technology started receiving large amounts of 
funding. Field practitioners in humanitarian demining want-
ed better tools and equipment as soon as possible and at af-
fordable prices. Researchers offered to help but didn’t manage 
to communicate that academic and industrial research is ex-
pensive and usually several years away from yielding finished 
products. Too many researchers did not understand why de-
miners were so reluctant to test unproven equipment in live 
minefields. Too often both sides felt let down by each other.
What researchers produce is usually several steps away 
from being usable in the field. Research results need to be 
turned into realistic prototypes that can be tested, which is 
the first step. Prototype tests then lead to a production de-
sign, and finally a production version that is first tested in 
simulation and then certified in live areas. However, this does 
not automatically mean the technology is going to be cost- 
effective or worth using, and each one of these development 
steps can cost more than the original research.
Researchers and their funders were highly motivated by 
what they saw as a moral obligation to focus their efforts on 
this humanitarian task. There was apparently a widespread 
assumption that there was no available means of clearing 
mines and that any advance—no matter how complex or 
costly—would be a step forward. In fact, manual demining 
methods were already well developed by the late 1980s. When 
properly managed, manual clearance was safe and reasonably 
cost-effective. My investigations showed that as much as 80 
percent of the demining research aimed to improve the de-
tection of buried mines, usually minimum metal mines, and 
ignored the majority of other urgent problems that field man-
agers face. In the 1990s, a minority of researchers began to 
analyze the problem. The Development Technology Unit of 
the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom, where I 
was working, observed deminers in Cambodia from a safe 
distance.  We discovered that they spent up to 70 percent of 
Photo courtesy of CISR.
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their time cutting vegetation. Clearly, the vegetation clear-
ance problem was urgent and led to the Tempest mini-flail, 
locally produced in Phnom Penh.2
In terms of reducing the cost and time of returning land to 
productive use, area reduction (defining the boundaries of the 
area that has to be cleared) and the resulting release of land 
without clearance is probably the single most important is-
sue. Although the topic was mentioned at conferences, only a 
few mine action field practitioners flagged this as an issue and 
researchers did not pick up the topic.3 
Expensive research projects continued to produce margin-
al gains in mine detection by developing equipment suitable 
for use on flat ground without vegetation. In terms of pure re-
search, this is the obvious path: start with the theory, develop 
the techniques, and gradually apply them to real world sce-
narios by developing prototypes to test. But this was not what 
the mine action world wanted. In 2016, as many countries ap-
proach the end of proactive mine clearance and are moving to 
management of residual contamination (MRC), the need for 
long-term research is becoming even harder to justify.
In the 1990s, there was a tango that went around and 
around but led nowhere. At meetings, researchers would ask 
“What are the key problems that we should be working on?” 
and field staff would reply, “What are the main areas where 
you can make a difference?” I remember one well-intentioned 
project where the researchers gave the mine action staff a long 
list of issues that the research could address and asked for pri-
oritization. The response was that all the problems were “very 
important.” Thus, no progress was made as no priorities were 
identified. Priorities cannot be determined by emotional ap-
peal but instead need analysis and tough decisions. Even less 
common were cost-benefit analyses.
At times, the degree of separation between the research 
lab and the field led to multiple failures. One research proj-
ect co-funded by the European Commission discovered that 
their lab equipment overheated and failed during field trials 
in Africa. Did their field partner not inform them about the 
hot weather because it seemed too obvious? Without a pri-
or survey, the manufacturer of a large, mine clearance ma-
chine complained that Cambodia had the “wrong type of 
minefields” despite spending large amounts of donor money 
to have the machine transported.
Six Primary Reasons Why Mine Action 
Technology Research Has Yielded Few Results
1. There is a deep-seated psychological need to address 
the horror of stepping on an unseen, anti-personnel (AP) 
mine as the top priority. There is also the feeling of “just one 
more breakthrough and we will be there.” Both of these tend 
to overrule rational analysis. This is not a research issue; fund- 
raising also relies on the public response to the horror of AP 
mines. Unexploded ordnance kills and injures more peo-
ple than AP mines, and unplanned explosions of munition 
stockpiles kill even more. However, the research proposals 
that seek to improve AP mine detection often focus on rela-
tively uncommon minimum metal mines.
2. While researchers wanted to improve knowl-
edge and its application, field practitioners usually thought 
the purpose of donor funding was to provide better tools 
and equipment in the short to medium term. Too much re-
search focused on generating solutions to problems that were 
not clearly identified. In one case, a project that cost sever-
al million Euros of public money showed that the probabil-
ity of detecting mines was reduced when the project’s “data 
fusion” method was applied. In the project’s final evalua-
tion, a university professor declared that the project was 
a useful contribution in that it showed what did not work, 
which was true but did not immediately benefit deminers. 
  Whereas many researchers and donors want to focus 
on breakthrough technologies, demining needs incremen-
tal improvements to well-established methods and technolo-
gies. Dismissing incremental improvements because they are 
somehow less important is a serious error. Metal detectors are 
an example of a successful, incremental improvement; perfor-
mance now is far better than it was 20 years ago; sensitivity, 
background compensation, size, weight and battery life have 
all significantly improved by manufacturers. Advanced and 
automatic data fusion methods for multi-sensor detection re-
ceived millions of research money to seek a breakthrough but 
made little or no impact in the field.
3. There has been a widespread failure to understand the 
economics of humanitarian demining. There are two parts to 
this misunderstanding: the first involves the overall econom-
ic purpose of mine action whereas the second concerns the 
cost of going from lab research to a finished, usable product. 
  There may be no overall benefit from a modest reduction 
in clearance costs if the money is diverted away from the local 
economy in the mine-affected country and instead supports 
high-tech research in first-world countries. The purpose 
of mine action is to save lives, reduce injuries and help re- 
establish livelihoods postwar. Employing hundreds, or even 
thousands, of deminers is an effective way to stimulate the 
local economy. The effect multiplies and boosts recovery 
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efforts as money recirculates around the community, and 
local people start small businesses. If the objective of mine 
action is to rebuild war-torn economies and help local peo-
ple, diverting resources to a rich country to pay for advanced 
technology in order to get a small gain on price per square 
meter makes no sense at all. Achieving the overall purpose 
of mine action is what matters; cost per square meter is only 
one part of this. Some new technology proposals have even 
threatened to drive up the cost of clearance. One such project 
received millions of Euros of public money and was based on 
detecting explosive using neutrons. The neutron generator 
required was very expensive, had a short life span and was so 
powerful it required registration by the user to comply with 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in force at the time. 
  The second economic issue is the gap caused 
by the amount of time and money that success-
ful laboratory research needs to yield a certified 
product for the field. Transition is difficult, slow and ex-
pensive, and usually costs more than the original research. 
  The market for improved mine action technologies is 
small and insufficient for expensive commercial develop-
ment. While I was project officer for new technologies at the 
European Commission in the early 2000s, many research 
funding proposals overestimated the potential sales of a fu-
ture product and underestimated the cost of product devel-
opment. A few projects predicted that the annual sales of 
their product would be worth more than the best estimate 
we had for the global budget for all humanitarian demining 
equipment worldwide.
4. Risk management has unexpected side effects. Most 
donors are not specialists and know little about mine action 
technology. To manage risk, they seek subject experts, who 
can make decisions on which projects to fund and how to 
evaluate progress. For some public sector donors, the use 
of these independent experts is a requirement. Available 
experts 20 years ago were usually academics with deep 
knowledge of the technology proposed or one of a group of 
recognized international mine action consultants who of-
ten had limited experience with military demining. It was 
difficult to recruit active field staff who comprehensively 
understood humanitarian mine action at the ground level; 
evaluating research proposals was widely viewed as a com-
plete waste of time for field staff. The situation was exacer-
bated by the requirement of some agencies for consultants 
to have advanced university degrees. Non-specialist do-
nors had no understanding of the enormous gap between 
the pool of available subject experts to decide on research 
proposals and the field practitioners who wanted better 
tools and equipment for immediate use in far-off lands. 
  Another effect of the dominance of military demining 
experience 20 years ago was large-scale funding for research 
projects focused on well-established military demining tasks. 
Some of these had little or no application to humanitarian de-
mining. There was no intention that humanitarian funding 
should be used for military research, but at times that is what 
happened for some high-cost technologies later used for mili-
tary purposes but not for humanitarian demining. 
5. A number of high-profile research projects, of-
ten supported by internationally well-known people, have 
gained public support and leveraged large-scale funding. 
The projects proposed were often expensive and unfeasible 
(e.g., reliable, airborne detection of individual buried mines 
through vegetation; rolling heavy objects over uneven ter-
rain in a random way without recording exactly where they 
passed), or were so expensive as to be entirely impractical 
for humanitarian purposes even if the technology worked. 
The publicity only mentioned the potential benefits, not the 
costs: “we have a responsibility to get these mines out of the 
ground and make the land safe for people to live a normal 
life without fear.”4 These projects not only wasted money but 
created a false public perception of demining and the role of 
mine action technology, and marginalized the demining or-
ganizations that they claimed to help. Moreover, they ignore 
the current solution: the properly trained and equipped hu-
man deminer. 
6. Mine action practitioners have not always shown 
interest in the best research ideas and, at times have in-
discriminately treated all research as equally lacking in 
value. For example, in 1999, a student research team dis-
covered that oval, cross-section prodders (a cheap and sim-
ple tool) significantly reduced the force needed to prod 
into hard soil compared to normal, round-section prod-
ders. Accidentally detonating mines while prodding in 
hard soil is a known source of accidents, so this simple, 
research-based advancement in technology could be ex-
pected to be widely used and well-publicized in the mine ac-
tion community. The risk to deminers could be reduced by 
“Metal detectors are an example of a successful, 
incremental improvement...”
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specifying oval prodders in operating procedures, contracts 
and mine action standards. However, the idea has not been 
widely embraced or shared. Is this the result of a “not in-
vented here” attitude, or just poor communication of ideas? 
Conclusion
As mine action in many countries moves from proactive 
clearance to reactive MRC, there is a real opportunity to im-
prove the take-up and cost effectiveness of new technology. 
MRC is a well understood process with a long history of suc-
cess, especially in northern Europe. There is already a wide 
range of commercial equipment, from simple hand tools to 
hi-tech systems, that is in daily use in countries still clear-
ing explosive remnants from the two World Wars. There is no 
significant technology gap that prevents effective MRC from 
working in Europe.
Adapting existing techniques and solutions for use in 
new climates and areas without the supporting infrastruc-
ture found in Europe will naturally require some resources. 
However, we cannot possibly justify repetitive research and 
development in an effort to reinvent the wheel. 
For proactive clearance, there are a lot of adaptive and in-
genious solutions that have already been developed under 
field conditions or through appropriate research such as the 
oval-section prodders mentioned above, or the use of rakes. 
Many of these solutions are known only locally because they 
have not been published or shared. Busy field staff rarely have 
spare time, extra money or interest in the amount of work re-
quired to publish an article or attend a conference. An equip-
ment catalogue that is more than a manufacturer’s sales sheet 
is needed. Collecting and sharing information about inventive 
solutions to regional problems (as well as broader problems) 
is both urgently needed and far more cost and time effective 
than high-technology research. An online catalogue that in-
cludes photos, videos, interviews and information about ac-
tual results, including costs and benefits, would be a valuable 
resource. Translation is an essential requirement for accessi-
bility, while constant maintenance and updating is necessary. 
After the information is collected, it should be made 
available to people who can use it. This goes far beyond pro-
viding a website or a printed document, even beyond more 
accessible technology such as apps for smartphones and tab-
lets. Sharing information must be an active process to iden-
tify, contact, interest and earn the trust of people who could 
benefit from the information. This is perhaps where research 
is needed. How do we get field managers, especially national 
staff, to take an interest in and put aside time to learn about 
technologies that could benefit their programs? The Croatian 
Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) organize mine action 
technology conferences, but at the last UNMAS/GICHD con-
ference, out of more than 70 participants, fewer than 10 were 
national staff from mine affected countries. How can we en-
courage more people who will select the technologies needed 
for their country and approve equipment budgets to attend? 
Why is this not already a priority?
Mine action could learn from other areas where a commu-
nity of practice has been established to support this type of tech-
nology transfer. Building a community of practice is not an easy 
task but would ensure that mine action technology moves for-
ward in terms of cost effectiveness and deminer safety.  
In addition, donors who are interested in funding mine ac-
tion technology research would benefit from learning about 
the realities of technical needs, the low probability of getting 
past the research stage to a production prototype, and the 
need for cost-benefit and technical appraisal.
Perhaps the most important question to ask is why mil-
lions of dollars is available for research into technology that 
is unlikely to succeed whereas funding to develop and share 
solutions based on existing technology is sparse. This is the 
core question that needs to be answered if we are to learn from 
experience.
It’s time to end the current situation where huge expendi-
tures have achieved so little, and technology research contin-
ues to deliver poor value for money. 
See endnotes page 66
The author wishes to thank Bob Keeley for his comments on 
the draft.
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STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION OF OBSOLETE 
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES IN MALI
by Marlène Dupouy and Charles Frisby [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]
Inadequate management of ammu-nition stockpiles can cause acci-dental explosions. The Small Arms 
Survey lists a total of 528 unplanned 
explosions of ammunition storage sites 
since January 1979, in more than half 
of United Nations member states.1 The 
March 2012 incident, which took place 
in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, is 
a reminder of the danger posed by poor 
stockpile management, as well as the 
tragic consequences affecting the pop-
ulation, environment and governments 
as a result of financial costs of clean-up 
exercises. The explosions in Brazzaville 
killed at least 300 people, injured more 
than 2,500 and left over 121,000 home-
less, according to Small Arms Survey.2 
In Mali, the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) oper-
ates under the mandate of the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) to 
help the government ensure the safe and 
effective management, storage and secu-
rity of national stockpiles.
Responding to a request from the 
Malian Ministry of Defence to reduce 
the immediate risks posed by unsafe 
missiles, stored near the Bamako-Sénou 
International Airport (Mali’s capital 
city), UNMAS disposed of 85 obsolete 
and expired surface-to-air missiles. The 
demolitions began on 28 March 2014 
in the Koulikoro region, 80 km (50 mi) 
north of Bamako, and were successful-
ly completed on 6 June 2014. Surface-
to-air missiles are not commonly 
encountered and require specific skills 
and methodologies for disposal. 
Identification of a Threat
Over the course of UNMAS’ assess-
ments of ammunition-storage facilities 
throughout Mali, a number of stockpiles 
of unserviceable, obsolete and unsafe 
ammunition were found and recorded—
these included 85 surface-to-air missiles 
located in an urban area. The shelf life 
of the missiles—which were delivered to 
Mali from the Soviet Union in the late 
1970s—expired in 1988, leaving the mis-
siles unserviceable. Unless destroyed, 
the propellant within the missiles would 
An obsolete surface-to-air missile covered with dust in Bamako before being moved to 
the demolition site.
All photos courtesy of Marc Vaillant, UNMAS Mali.
have degraded over time to the point of 
an apparent spontaneous combustion. 
Gradual degradation of explosive or haz-
ardous components in outdated ammu-
nition poses a serious explosive hazard 
and is a primary cause of unplanned ex-
plosions of ammunition stockpiles.
The Demolition Process
Starting on 28 March 2014, all op-
erations were closely coordinated with 
the Malian Defence and Security Forces 
(MDSF), which contributed to building 
a relationship of trust between UNMAS 
and the Malian authorities. Following 
a technical assessment of the physical 
FEATURE
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All missiles were moved to the demolition site progressively, with an average of two missiles moved and destroyed every day over 
two months.
UNMAS team securing and dismantling a missile in preparation of destruction.
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condition of the missiles, the team de-
cided to move them carefully by truck 
from their location in Bamako to an 
isolated demolition site in Koulikoro, 
which UNMAS previously prepared.
Six members of MDSF, who previ-
ously underwent Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) training, were de-
ployed to the demolition site for on-
the-job training where they gained 
practical skills and firsthand experi-
ence as they participated in the disposal 
process.  Following preliminary prepa-
ration of the missiles, they were dis-
posed of through a controlled burn of 
the rocket motor and propellant, cou-
pled with detonation of the high explo-
sive components.
 Professionally implemented in 
accordance with International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) and the 
International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG), the operation 
went smoothly and safely. A ceremo-
ny attended by representatives from 
MDSF, the United Nations and na-
tional and international journalists 
marked the completion of the project 
on 6 June 2014.
Stockpile Management Impact 
Disposal of obsolete ammunition 
stockpiles helps to minimize the risk of 
accidental explosions, therefore protect-
ing civilians from potential threat and 
displacement, while also preventing the 
destruction of infrastructure and reduc-
ing related economic impact. Stockpile 
management is more than the prevention 
of unplanned or accidental explosions—it 
is also a matter of preventing unregulated 
access to weaponry. As such, the project 
also contributes to the U.N.’s regional and 
international disarmament and counter 
proliferation efforts.
This project is part of UNMAS’ ef-
forts to support the Malian authorities 
David Gressly, Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General/
Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, activates the demolition of two missiles dur-
ing his visit to the demolition site on 18 April 2015, with the assistance of UNMAS 
Programme Manager, Charles Frisby.
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to secure and safely manage national weapons and ammuni-
tion stockpiles, which includes the refurbishment of armor-
ies and the provision of technical support and training to the 
MDSF. Training and capacity-building activities are essential 
to ensure the sustainability of such projects. Knowledge and 
competencies must be developed at various levels, ranging 
from the institutions responsible for security to the person-
nel in charge of managing weapons and ammunition depots. 
UNMAS Mali provided training courses in storage safety and 
management to 57 MDSF personnel (depot manager, armorer 
and administrator levels) during 2013 and 2014. In addition, 
50 MDSF personnel from Gao and Bamako received a practi-
cal two-day introduction to stockpile safety and management. 
UNMAS regularly shares key lessons learned with the head-
quarters team and the peacekeeping mission.
Planning for the Future
National authorities expressed appreciation for the safe 
destruction of the missiles, after which the Ministry of 
Defence made a new request for the destruction of an addi-
tional 60 tons of obsolete ammunition stored in the wider area 
of Bamako, (mostly artillery projectiles, mortars, rockets and 
grenades). The latter was completed in late June 2014.
The UNMAS program has destroyed a total of 390 tons of 
weapons and ammunition in Mali, with operations ongoing. 
This first disposal of 85 missiles laid the foundations for years 
of partnership with the government of Mali to reinforce its 
ability to manage explosive threats throughout the country.  
See endnotes page ##
Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General/ Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, David Gressly, during his 
field visit on 18 April 2014, with UNMAS Programme Manager Charles Frisby.
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THE ARGUMENT FOR THERMAL 
TREATMENT: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
by Chad Clifton [ Sterling International Group, LLC ]
Historically, large, aging con-ventional weapons stockpiles in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have been a challenge to regional se-
curity in Eastern Europe and poten-
tially beyond. The International Trust 
Fund Enhancing Human Security 
(ITF), the Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement in the U.S. Department 
of State’s Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA), and many other 
donors have funded stockpile reduc-
tion efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and in surrounding regions since 1999. 
Currently, PM/WRA funds U.S.-based 
contractor Sterling International Group, 
LLC (Sterling) to destroy weapons stock-
piles under a bilateral technical agree-
ment between the United States and the 
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Under this agreement, Sterling destroys 
approximately 500 tons of excess muni-
tions yearly through open burning and 
open detonation at the military range 
facilities near Glamoč. This program 
is a continuation of an effort originally 
funded by PM/WRA in 2009 and imple-
mented through ITF.     
The destruction of these munitions 
occurs near the end of a long chain 
of activities conducted by the Armed 
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
demilitarize or otherwise disassemble 
explosive items. Munitions that cannot 
be disassembled due to age, condition or 
other technical issues are sent to Sterling 
at Glamoč. A high priority for the 
governments of the United States and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the 
destruction of 20 mm ammunition due 
Thermal treatment furnace at Glamoč as seen from a protective concave wall. 
All photos courtesy of Sterling International Group, LLC.
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to the age and condition of these stockpiles. This ammunition 
type, high-explosive incendiary (HEI) and HEI with tracers 
(HEI-T), was the cause of a major explosion at a facility 
performing manual large-scale disassembly in nearby Serbia. 
The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined 
that it would take a disproportionate amount of time and 
resources to disassemble these munitions and then dispose of 
the primers, powder, warheads, tracers and cartridge cases. 
These munitions were therefore marked for destruction by 
open burning and open detonation.
Challenges With Destruction
Ammunition of this type presents a unique problem: it is 
too thick for traditional explosive destruction. The thickness 
of a 20 mm projectile casing and the relatively small explo-
sive weight of each round make it expensive to destroy using 
military-grade explosives, such as C4 or Semtex, and nearly 
impossible to destroy using most commercially available ex-
plosives. For example, estimates indicate that 1 kg (2.2 lb) 
of plastic explosives would be required to detonate eight 20 
mm rounds if conducting open detonation, which is a large 
consumption rate considering the cost of military-grade 
plastic explosives. At approximately US$17 per kilogram, 
they are difficult to procure and troublesome to transport. 
Destroying the 2 million 20mm rounds classified by Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for destruction would cost approximately 
$4.25 million in explosives alone—not including the cost of 
technicians, support staff and other project requirements.
The range at Glamoč allows a very small net explosive 
quantity of only 300 kg (660 lb), which allows approximately 
1,200 20 mm rounds per shot and is very expensive in terms of 
personnel and time.
While too tough for efficient explosive destruction, 20 
mm is often considered a bit too large for thermal treatment. 
Many programs conduct open burning of small arms ammu-
nition where munitions are unpacked and loosely spread in an 
open pit containing wood or other flammables. The pit is then 
doused with fuel and ignited. The resulting flames ignite the 
propellant in each round, which launches the bullet a short dis-
tance and is generally contained within the pit. Steel furnaces 
replaced this type of open burning in which the combustible 
material and small arms munitions are placed within a large 
steel box, and the burn is conducted in a manner similar to the 
pit. However, unlike the pit, the furnace is safer and contains 
the small explosions from the propellant, trapping bullets as 
they fire. Many ammunition technicians refer to this arrange-
ment as the popcorn treatment. Furnaces can also be outfitted 
with filters and ventilators to control the release of particulates 
into the atmosphere. Some furnace designs include a steel feed 
tube or chute, which allows operators to slowly add more am-
munition into the furnace and maintain the heat level, thus 
maximizing the heat and effectiveness of the operation.
Sterling workers demonstrate destruction of 20 mm ammunition to U.S. and Bosnia and Herzegovina government observers.
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Unfortunately, unlike conventional small arms ammu-
nition, which contain a solid lead or metal alloy projectile, 
20 mm cartridges contain a fuze and internal explosive ma-
terial designed to detonate upon hitting the target. This type 
of explosion is much larger than the pop of the propellant and 
generally exceeds the safety limits of most locally construct-
ed steel-box furnaces. Although a number of commercially 
manufactured furnaces could deal with 20 mm, these are ex-
pensive to build and operate, often approaching the cost of ex-
plosive treatment previously described.
This created a logistical and technical problem for the 
Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as they addressed 
millions of unwanted 20 mm rounds in their inventory. 
Sterling responded by expanding upon existing designs for 
thermal treatment of ammunition and developed a 2-x-2-m 
(2.2-x-2.2-yd) furnace with inserts.
Solution to Large-caliber Munition Destruction
Made of 20 mm rolled steel, the Sterling furnace can safely 
contain the explosive force of 20 mm detonations. Likewise, 
Sterling increased the thickness of feed chutes, vents and 
chimneys to 10–15 mm to deal with increased heat and ex-
plosive force. Rather than use dunnage or other combustible 
material inside the furnace, it is heated from the outside using 
large, remotely controlled propane or oil-fired burners.
Once the furnace reaches a temperature of 250 C (482 F), 
operators feed a small amount of ammunition into the fur-
nace core via a baffled feed chute. Operators are approximately 
35 feet from the furnace while detonations occur. There is 
adequate steel and concrete between the operators and the 
ammunition. The furnace is designed to contain all of the 
hazardous effects from the blast. The chute contains a two-
door system, which lets the operator load several rounds into 
the feed chamber, close the safety door and then open the 
release door, allowing new munitions to slide into the com-
bustion chamber. The chute’s height and angle is configured 
to allow operators to work at a safe distance from the low- 
level explosions occurring within the furnace. Operators feed 
ammunition at a steady rate while constantly monitoring the 
sounds of each explosion, thereby preventing a buildup of 
ammunition that might exceed the furnace’s design.
The furnace routinely runs at its operational temperature 
for up to five hours, disposing 3,000 rounds of 20 mm ammu-
nition per day. Smaller caliber ammunition, such as 12.7 mm, 
can be disposed at a rate of 10,500 rounds in a typical work-
day. This furnace configuration burns through approximately 
35 L (9 gal) of propane gas per hour, varying slightly in rela-
tion to outside temperatures.                     
Sterling made a number of improvements to the furnace 
based on its experience with this method. The blast chamber 
was modified to incorporate removable inserts, allowing larg-
er caliber ammunition such as 20 mm cartridges to detonate 
inside the furnace without damaging its interior. While the 
nature of the replacement process means the furnace will still 
need to cool down before damaged inserts can be replaced, 
the operation maintains spares to eliminate any additional 
Earth, concrete and steel containers form a concave barrier away from personnel in the chute structure.
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downtime while damaged inserts are repaired at an off-site 
facility without halting operations. The cost of insert repairs 
is also lower than repairs to the furnace interior. The inserts 
also baffle the blast, reduce noise pollution and contain the 
blast fragments.
Since incorporating the thermal treatment furnace into 
operations in late 2013, Sterling destroyed more than 300,000 
rounds of 20 mm ammunition along with more than 1.5 mil-
lion rounds of other small arms ammunition. At this pace, 
more than 2 million unwanted 20 mm rounds in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will be eliminated within two years at a fraction 
of the cost needed to dispose of these rounds by other means.
Drawbacks of Thermal Treatment
Although cost-effective, thermal treatment has its down-
sides. Even with a number of safety features, the design still 
incorporates operators working in fairly close proximity 
to the furnace, which could prove dangerous if an uncon-
trolled detonation were to occur. Therefore, strict control is 
required when feeding the munitions into the chute and in 
monitoring individual detonations. Moreover, furnaces re-
main hot for several hours after combustible material is in-
troduced by design, preventing quick stoppage following a 
perceived incident. The furnace must cool down while op-
erators remain at a safe distance. In 2014, operators over-
whelmed the furnace, building up explosive material that 
ignited and damaged the furnace.                                          
Emissions are also a concern during these operations. 
Particulates released from the chimney are constantly moni-
tored, verifying that emissions meet environmental standards 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Environmental controls inherent 
in the design include but are not limited to the following: con-
tainment of hazardous materials, high burning temperatures 
that ensure complete burning of materials, a relatively tall 
chimney, and good air flow design. To protect the surround-
ing environment, nearby soil and water are closely monitored 
for possible contaminants. Operators on-site are required to 
wear respirators and protective clothing to shield against lead 
Personnel load items into the furnace via one of two chutes. Gas burners below furnace raise internal temperature above 250 
degrees Celsius (482 degrees Farenheit).
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exposure. Operators are also physically examined to ensure 
they are not exposed to dangerous contaminants. These pre-
cautions also occur at demilitarization (DEMIL) facilities that 
disassemble or pull apart munitions.
Furnace designs may need alterations in some countries, 
as environmental regulations might require chimney scrub-
bers and other means of attaining emission levels consis-
tent with national standards. Companies pursuing a thermal 
treatment operation must examine the standards of the coun-
try in question.
Conclusion
Conventional weapons and ammunition stockpiles jeopar-
dize safety and security in a large number of countries. Given 
the global economic climate and location of conventional 
weapons destruction problems in many developing countries, 
an efficient, effective and reasonably priced solution is critical-
ly important. A thermal treatment furnace following a fairly 
low-technology design can be produced within local econo-
mies for under $50,000. This method can destroy ammunition 
stockpiles quickly and safely, especially 20 mm ammunition, 
without the need for expensive explosive material. The pro-
cess requires fewer personnel, and the training requirement 
for operators is much lower than required for DEMIL or open 
burning and open detonation. Fuel costs are also low through 
use of locally available fuel oil or other standard heating fuel. 
Fuel costs average $0.02 per round. This figure is based on 35 
L of fuel (at current exchange rate) to treat 3,000 rounds of 20 
mm ammunition. The furnace is ultimately a safe option as 
Chad Clifton
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Removable inserts isolate 20 mm ammunition and allow separate repairs and uninterrupted operations.
well, with blasts contained and shrapnel potential eliminated. 
The furnace is certified using U.S. Department of Defense best 
practice methodology during research and development work 
(1.25 times the limit) and the shielding was tested well beyond 
this threshold. Thermal treatment is an excellent option for 
African, Eastern European and Southeast Asian countries 
with stockpile-reduction requirements. It is an appropriate so-
lution that is effective, efficient, productive and safe. 
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UNMAS GAZA EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE REPORT
by Mark Frankish [ UNMAS Gaza ]
From 7 July to 26 August 2014, significant quantities of explosive ordnance were used during hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Gazan 
armed groups. It is reported that approximately 72,000 items 
of ordnance were fired and launched during this period.1 This 
presented a significant risk for civilians and hampered hu-
manitarian and reconstruction operations. Many unexplod-
ed aircraft bombs, tank projectiles, mortar shells and other 
munitions from both sides of the conflict were reported in 
civilian areas. Based on a 10 percent fail rate, it was assumed 
there are approximately 7,200 items of explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) in Gaza, including a significant number of air de-
livered bombs.2 The ERW contamination has interrupted the 
lives of entire communities in Gaza, where simply gaining 
access to homes, schools, health facilities, etc. 
is challenging and dangerous. Livelihoods 
are also directly affected when small indus-
tries and farmlands are destroyed and littered 
with ERW. 
The military operations resulted in over 
2,000 casualties in Gaza, 65 in Israel and 
massive damage to infrastructure and civil-
ian property in Gaza.3 A review on struc-
tures by United Nations Operational Satellite 
Applications Programme (UNOSAT) de-
tailed that within the 327 sq km (126 sq mi) 
of the Gaza strip, 6,761 structures were de-
stroyed, 3,565 were severely damaged and 
4,938 were moderately damaged. In addi-
tion, there were 7,473 craters recorded in ag-
ricultural and non-urbanized areas.4
Approximately 74 percent of the damage sustained was with-
in 3 km (1.8 mi) of the Armistice Line. Within this area multiple 
neighborhoods such as Shuja’iyya, Beit Hanoun, Khuza’a, etc., 
were damaged to such an extent that the vast majority of struc-
tures in these communities were completely destroyed.
Threat Defined 
While the majority of ERW seen to date in Gaza is of con-
ventional type, there have been no reports of submunitions 
or landmines used with the exception of anti-tank mines de-
ployed by combat engineers in the destruction of buildings. 
Ground ordnance in the form of tank, artillery, cannon and 
Figure 1. Damage assessment summary.
Damage Assessment Summary
Destroyed Severely  Damaged
Moderately 
Damaged
Total Structures 
Affected Crater Impact
North Gaza 1,253 761 1,000 3,014 1,702
Gaza City 1,963 1,127 1,378 4,468 1,765
Deir Al Balah 809 406 683 1,898 553
Khan Younis 1,749 898 1,379 4,026 1,549
Rafah 987 373 498 1,858 1,604
Total 6,761 3,565 4,938 16,264 7,473
Extent of ERW damage in the residential area in Beit Lahiya, Gaza.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS.
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recoilless projectiles, mortar bombs, grenades, and rockets 
all exist. In addition, there is the threat from air delivered 
ordnance of up to 2,000 lb (907 kg) bombs and the toxico-
logical hazard associated with fired-depleted uranium, armor- 
piercing projectiles.
UNMAS Gaza Emergency Response 
On 27 July 2014, in response to a directive from the U.N. 
Secretary General, the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) deployed three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
technical advisors to work directly with the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and 
other U.N. agencies. The UNMAS team was based 
in the UNRWA compound during the conflict and 
was responsible for carrying out ERW risk assess-
ments at U.N. facilities and other structures. This 
was to ensure that U.N. personnel and civilians 
seeking refuge in U.N. premises were safe from 
ERW and other explosive hazards. During the 
emergency response, UNMAS Gaza carried out 
214 ERW risk assessments on facilities of which 
209 were cleared and five were handed back to the 
parent organization to be included within the re-
construction phase. As a result, UNRWA was in a 
position to reopen all schools on their scheduled 
date, thereby enabling 240,000 children to resume 
their academic curriculum in a safe environment 
free from ERW. The UNMAS emergency response 
phase was critical to address immediate ERW and 
other explosive threats to the U.N., as well as re-
sponding to the critical humanitarian needs of the 
general civilian population.
This deployment was vital in facilitating an 
ERW response during the early stages of the con-
f lict. The immediate ERW threats to the civil-
ian population were addressed and requirements 
for a long-term ERW response were determined 
through a defined needs assessment. The assess-
ment included the identification and analysis of 
the ERW threat, identifying those affected by the 
threat, as well as the extent and measurable ef-
fects caused by the threat. The approach was “bot-
tom-up” whereby all community stakeholders and 
beneficiaries were consulted prior to any program 
development, thereby identifying potential barri-
ers early. The results of the needs assessment were 
formalized within the UNMAS Gaza concept of 
operations (CONOPS).
Overview of ERW Risk Assessment 
Generic risk assessment is a multi-disciplinary approach 
used by many organizations and industries for hazard identi-
fication, accident prevention and mitigation. It consists of an 
objective evaluation of hazards and risks in which supposi-
tions and fears are measured, analyzed and presented so that 
a decision can be made concerning a course of action.
Within the context of the UNMAS Gaza emergency re-
sponse, a hazard was defined as any item of ERW that could 
 UNRWA classroom in Biet Hanoon.
Destroyed residential area of Shejaayea.
Removal of a neutralized 2000 lb bomb at the Rafah border crossing.
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cause harm, whereas a risk was defined as the chance that 
somebody could be harmed by an ERW hazard. Therefore 
the ERW risk assessment was an invaluable process that de-
termined how the ERW hazards were defined and how they 
affected planning and operations. A conscious decision was 
made to ensure that the processes should always work toward 
producing useful information that can be assimilated practi-
cally into all levels of operations. The ERW risk assessment 
was a systematic and investigative process that involved iden-
tifying hazards, predicting possible incidents, and determin-
ing the impact of hazards and mitigation measures that can be 
implemented or planned.
Principles of ERW Risk Assessment 
The ERW risk assessments were conducted in a con-
stantly changing environment due to the f luid nature of the 
conf lict in Gaza. From an operational management per-
spective, the following core principles guided our principle- 
based approach: 
• The protection of human life—conducting ERW risk as-
sessments inevitably exposed individuals to a high level 
of risk; therefore, all exposure was preemptive and de-
liberate where possible, with all mitigation measures in 
place. 
• The adoption of a holistic view—ensuring that the ERW 
risk assessments were viewed as an integrated system 
with several interconnecting components, all of which 
needed to be analyzed in order to determine the threat 
or hazard. 
• The adoption of an investigative mindset—knowing the 
mission, method and means of the conflict often revealed 
the most probable type and extent of ERW contamina-
tion likely to be encountered. However, the importance 
of remaining open-minded was emphasized, as it can 
lessen the risks of making premature decisions and de-
veloping personal biases. 
• The dissemination of detailed and practical find-
ings ensured that mitigation measures could be ef-
fectively implemented and monitored with minimal 
disruption. 
Phases of ERW Risk Assessment 
In order to develop a comprehensive, reliable and consis-
tent ERW risk assessment system, the following six-phased 
approach was adopted for all ERW risk assessment activities, 
regardless of requesting agency or facility type: 
• Task planning 
• Risk assessment 
• Information analysis 
• Report production 
• Information dissemination 
• Process evaluation 
The phases flow in a continuous cycle creating a system 
that is self-improving and adaptable to most situations.
ERW Risk Assessment Methodology 
Conducting ERW risk assessments within the context of 
the Gaza armed conflict, whether during the conflict or im-
mediately after the cessation of hostilities, was challenging 
due to the specific facets that had to be considered. These fac-
ets included security, access, logistics, neutrality, and access 
to locations and information sources. Particularly challeng-
ing during the ERW risk assessments was the ever-changing 
security situation that could change from a workable, condu-
cive environment to one of heightened danger in a short peri-
od of time. In an attempt to mitigate the security threat whilst 
conducting ERW risk assessments, a very specific security risk 
management plan through an ERW Security CONOPS was 
defined and implemented with the UNRWA field security of-
fice (FSO), which included:
• Casualty Evacuation procedures 
• Contingency plans 
• Coordination mechanisms 
• Escort arrangements 
• Identification of safe havens 
• Route assessment and planning 
• Security measures
• Security risk assessment matrix
As the purpose of the ERW risk assessment was to iden-
tify hazards and risks, this methodology was chosen through 
a fact-building questionnaire within an ERW risk assessment 
report. This methodology was chosen because it provides a 
systematic way of evaluating situations, ascertaining threats, 
collecting and analyzing information, and reporting pertinent 
facts and results to the client. 
On completion of the ERW risk assessment report, all de-
tails were forwarded to the requesting agency along with de-
tails of any recommended risk-mitigation measures.
ERW Risk Assessment Results Analysis
The following section is an analysis of the collat-
ed ERW risk assessment resulting from the 214 facili-
ties visited. The actual analysis was a two-stage process 
where the data was identified and organized into the pre- 
selected tables and then interpreted to gain a better un-
derstanding of the facts.
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Requesting Agency Type 
The following summarizes which agencies requested 
ERW risk assessments: 
• A total number of 214 ERW risk assessment requests 
were received and completed giving a 100 percent re-
sponse rate. 
• U.N. agencies accounted for 99 percent of the ERW risk 
assessment requests, with the majority of ERW risk as-
sessment requests originating from UNRWA (146), fol-
lowed by UNICEF (26); United Nations Development 
Programme (15); and United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (14). 
• Educational facilities comprised 65 percent of the 
ERW risk assessment requests, while medical facilities 
comprised 10 percent. 
• Although it was openly stated during all humanitarian 
meetings attended by UNMAS Gaza during the emer-
gency response phase that UNMAS was available to 
help, UNMAS received only one request for an ERW 
risk assessment from an NGO. 
• A relatively low number of UNICEF-supported 
schools were assessed by UNMAS Gaza because the 
Civil Protection Police (CPP) EOD teams conducted the 
majority of ERW risk assessments at the request of the 
Ministry of Education.
ERW Designation Type
A total number of 381 items of ERW (or component 
parts) were located and cleared with the assistance of the 
CPP EOD teams. 
• The highest proportion of ERW type cleared was the 105 
mm and 120 mm high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) mu-
nitions, with 59 percent recorded. This ammunition is 
associated with the two main variants of the Merkeva 
main battle tank. These HEAT munitions were alleg-
edly used to reduce collateral damage, as the munitions 
contain directional charges (as opposed to being omni- 
directional) and have considerably less explosives.6 
• For 60 percent of the 93 assessments where 155 mm il-
luminating artillery ammunition was cleared, the muni-
tion consisted of an empty illuminating projectile casing. 
It should be noted, however, that substantial damage was 
UNRWA 
Schools
UNRWA 
Clinics
UNWRA 
Other UNDP
UNICEF 
Schools UNSCO
WHO 
Hospitals
UNESCO 
Education
NGO 
Education Total
ERW RA 
Requests 100 12 34 15 26 3 9 14 1 214
ERW RA
Completions 100 12 34 15 26 3 9 14 1 214
Figure 2. ERW risk assessment by agency.
Agency RA’s A/CBomb
155 mm 
Illum
155 mm
HE 
120 mm
Tank 
HEAT
120 mm 
HE 
Mortar
105 mm 
Tank 
HEAT
80 mm 
HE
Mortar
Mine Grenade Guided Missiles Total
UNRWA 
Schools 100 0 30 0 32 6 41 0 0 1 7 117
UNRWA 
Clinics 12 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6
UNRWA 
Other 34 1 3 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 9
UNDP 15 5 10 0 20 1 11 5 0 0 0 52
UNICEF 
Schools 26 9 37 0 68 13 5 0 1 0 0 133
UNSCO 3 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
WHO 
Hospitals 9 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
UNESCO 
Education 14 7 0 0 23 0 10 0 0 0 1 41
NGO 
Education 1 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Total 214 22 93 5 153 20 73 5 1 1 8 381
Figure 3. ERW designation types.
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sustained to many facilities due to the free falling casings, 
including one that entered the roof and exited the floor 
pan of a U.N. Special Coordinator’s Office (UNSCO) B6 
armored land-cruiser.
• In all assessments of guided missile use, the component 
parts recovered were thought to be those of Hellfire guid-
ed missiles. 
• The only recorded use of a mine was an M-15 anti-tank 
mine that was used as a demolition charge to destroy a 
mosque adjacent to a Palestine Authority (PA) school; 
the mine only partially detonated with the remnants be-
ing thrown into the school grounds. 
• All aerial bomb component parts matched that of the 
MK-80 series, low-drag, general-purpose aerial bomb. 
• The only hand grenade recovered was an M26 hand gre-
nade that was cleared following a family dispute at an 
UNRWA school, which was being used as a camp for in-
ternally displaced persons. 
• All ERW items cleared, with the exception of the hand 
grenade and 120 mm mortars, originated from the IDF 
or the Israeli Air Force (IAF).
Structural Damage 
Figure 4 provides analysis on the sustained structural 
damage: 
• Of all facilities that were assessed, 70 percent received 
some degree of structural damage whether through di-
rect fire or indirect fire, with 30 percent receiving no 
structural damage.7,8 
• There was a higher proportion of ERW risk assessed fa-
cilities that received structural damage through indirect 
fire (53 percent) than direct fire (47 percent). 
• Of the UNESCO facilities that were assessed, 92 per-
cent were found to have sustained structural damage 
from either direct fire or indirect fire, with 73 percent of 
UNICEF-supported PA schools having sustained some 
level of damage. 
• The damage ranged from Small Arms Ammunition 
(SAA) impact strikes to the total destruction of buildings 
and facilities by the use of aerial bombs. 
• In addition to damage sustained from direct fire or indi-
rect fire, some facilities also had direct damage from IAF 
armored bulldozers; this is especially the case for facili-
ties located to the east of the Salah Ed Deen main arte-
rial route. 
• The one NGO facility, a children’s nursery, was complete-
ly destroyed by tank projectiles, artillery projectiles, aer-
ial bombs and armored bulldozers.
Evidence of Military Occupation 
Evidence of military occupation is presented in the follow-
ing narrative and in Figure 5: 
• Only eight percent of ERW risk assessments saw evidence 
of any military occupation. 
• This eight percent was only evident in UNRWA Schools 
and UNICEF-supported school facilities. 
Aerial Bomb Clearance 
• During the UNMAS Gaza emergency response, a total of 
118 aerial bombs were destroyed with 16 neutralized by 
UNMAS Gaza prior to final disposal by detonation. The 
Ministry of Interior realized that not all EOD tasks can 
be undertaken by the CPP EOD teams due to limitations 
in their technical knowledge base and therefore request-
ed UNMAS to render-safe the bomb fuzes. 
• Conducting major EOD clearance- tasks within the 
post-conflict Gaza environment was and still is ex-
tremely complex due to the differing interlocutors that 
must be considered and consulted. It is of paramount 
Agency RA’s Direct Fire
Indirect
 Fire Total
UNRWA Schools 100 25 42 67
UNRWA Clinics 12 1 7 8
UNRWA Other 34 13 14 27
UNDP 15 6 2 8
UNICEF Schools 26 13 6 19
UNSCO 3 1 0 1
WHO Hospitals 9 2 4 6
UNESCO Education 14 8 5 13
NGO Education 1 1 0 1
Total 214 70 80 150
Figure 4. Structural damage analysis.
Agency RA’s IDF Armed Groups Total
UNRWA Schools 100 4 7 11
UNRWA Clinics 12 0 0 0
UNRWA Other 34 0 0 0
UNDP 15 0 0 0
UNICEF Schools 26 5 0 5
UNSCO 3 0 0 0
WHO Hospitals 9 0 0 0
UNESCO Education 14 0 0 0
NGO Education 1 0 0 0
Total 214 9 7 16
Figure 5. Evidence of military occupation.
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importance that for any major EOD operation, prior ap-
proval must be gained from the Ministry of Interior, the 
UNRWA director and the UNMAS director, and all rel-
evant information must be presented to the Coordinator 
of Government Activities in the Territories Unit in the 
Coordination and Liaison Administration for Gaza.
Aerial Bomb and Fuze Technical Analysis 
A technical analysis on the 16 aerial bombs rendered safe 
including the following:
• All of the aerial bombs and 67 percent of the fuzes were of 
NATO origin and manufacture.
• Small diameter bombs accounted for 31 percent of the 
aerial bombs rendered safe; low drag general purpose 
bombs accounted for the remaining 69 percent. 
• The 1000 lb aerial bomb was the most common aerial 
bomb type rendered safe, accounting for 43 percent of 
aerial bombs. 
• An electronic multi-functioning aerial bomb fuze was 
the most common fuze type rendered safe, accounting 
for 38 percent of aerial bombs. 
• During the render-safe operation, stuck-fast fuzes oc-
curred in 25 percent of cases. With these aerial bombs, 
there was a medium degree of bomb body deformation 
through the initial impact with the target. This would 
have caused movement of the internal components with-
in the aerial bomb, potentially leading to misfires and 31 
percent of the aerial bomb fuzes had armed and partially 
functioned, but the detonating wave was not transferred 
into the booster element. 
• In aerial bombs where both nose and tail fuzes could be 
fitted, only tail fuzes were used with inert aerodynamic 
plugs fitted in the nose cavity.
Summary 
Ensuring the safety of staff during operations was of par-
amount importance and required that UNMAS Gaza effec-
tively manage the ever-changing security situation through 
the creation and implementation of a specific security risk 
management system. This was only possible through the close 
coordination and facilitation of the UNRWA FSO, who was 
fundamental in the management of the security enabling en-
vironment. 
Conducting ERW risk assessments was and is a sensitive 
and delicate process, as it deals with how hazards and risks are 
perceived and managed. In order to eliminate any personal 
bias during the ERW risk assessment procedure, it was vital 
that a formal and systematic ERW risk assessment procedure 
was agreed upon, documented, applied and reviewed. The de-
fined ERW risk assessment methodology has been modified 
to suit the specific nuances of other ERW risk assessments 
within a phased response. Initially, the ERW risk assessment 
procedure was defined for the UNMAS emergency response 
phase and now has been modified for the UNMAS ERW re-
construction support phase.
The analysis of the ERW risk assessments from the 214 fa-
cilities visited was based on a relatively small sample num-
ber when looking at the quantities of explosive ordnance used 
and the damage and destruction within the wider context of 
the 2014 conflict. While in-depth, valid information was ob-
tained, it should not be viewed as an exact representation of 
the situation Gaza-wide. 
It should be noted that when managing the recovered data, 
a conscious effort was made to present “real impartial data” 
as opposed to unsubstantiated anecdotes. The data was sim-
ply presented in an unbiased manner with the intention of de-
termining useful information and formulating conclusions to 
assist in the technical decision making process.
Collectively, the UNMAS emergency response findings 
and the results from the ERW response needs assessment pro-
vided the prerequisite information needed to accurately de-
fine the future UNMAS Gaza CONOPS. This has and will 
continue to ensure that appropriate technical assets and sup-
port mechanisms are in place for each operational phase, 
thereby ensuring that UNMAS continues to meet and exceed 
the expectations of all stakeholders involved. 
See endnotes page 66
Mark Frankish
Ammunition & Weapon Management Advisor
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Website: www.mineaction.org
Mark Frankish is a former British 
army bomb disposal officer who 
has worked in ERW and mine action 
since 1998 for The HALO Trust, 
UNMAS and within the Gas and Oil 
Sectors (Shell & Exxon Mobil). He 
joined UNMAS in 2001 in Kosovo and 
worked in numerous projects at both 
an operational and program management level until 
2010. Since 2010, he has continued working within the 
humanitarian and commercial sectors, and most recently 
he was the ammunition and weapons management 
advisor for UNMAS during the Gaza Emergency Response 
2014 – 2015. He has a MA in post conflict reconstruction 
and development from the University of York (U.K.).
24
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol20/iss1/1
25ISSUE 20.1 @ MARCH 2016
ARMS MANAGEMENT AND DESTRUCTION 
PROGRAMMING: TAKING STOCK
The Arms Management and Destruction (AMD) sec-tor—an element of conventional weapons destruction (CWD) that includes several elements of physical se-
curity and stockpile management (PSSM)—has experienced 
dynamic growth over the last 18 months. An increasing num-
ber of programs address illicit and poorly stored weapons, en-
hance the safety and security of arms storage, and support the 
development of national capacity, including MAG’s regional 
initiative in the Sahel and West Africa. As a distinct AMD 
sector emerges, now is the time to analyze what makes pro-
gramming strategies effective as well as ineffective. The in-
dustry must resist the temptation to talk about best practice 
which distracts from the importance of tailoring AMD assis-
tance to specific national contexts. Rather than seek to rep-
licate projects, focus should be on identifying, sharing and 
by Chris Loughran and Djadranka Gillesen [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]
embedding good practice, and the approaches that underpin 
successful programming in a specific national context.
Ensuring Needs-based Programming
Three years ago, MAG explained one of its key messages to 
donors: include and fund assessments, and develop assistance 
projects based on their findings. This followed a number of 
instances in which small arms projects were designed solely 
on the basis of national reporting under the U.N. Programme 
of Action and without technical assessment missions. When 
MAG engaged to deliver a project, successful delivery re-
quired significant reworking.
States took this on board and now support MAG to imple-
ment assessment-based AMD projects for weapons and muni-
tions. Two years of assessments led to further refinements in 
In Ségou, MAG built four armories, rehabilitated three armories and installed two containerized armories. To enable safe and se-
cure management of weapons and ammunition, specialized equipment was installed at each site. This included bullet traps, adapt-
ed weapon racks, metal cabinets for long SA/LW and oversized weapons, and fire powder extinguishers outside the stores. Once 
the physical security was obtained, MAG provided training for staff.
All photos courtesy of Sean Sutton, MAG.
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MAG’s approach. Assessments initially focused on the need 
and scope for weapons and munitions destruction, armory 
and explosive storehouse construction or rehabilitation, and 
the training required for storekeepers and managers.
These activities still form the core of assessments and 
subsequent assistance activities; they also ensure that pro-
gramming is needs-based. However, MAG now undertakes 
assessments jointly with national authorities, ensuring that 
subsequent recommendations are fully owned nationally. 
MAG’s approach assists authorities in determining their 
AMD needs, aiding the development of longer-term plan-
ning and prioritization of needs. This approach also enables 
development of accurate project costing. MAG expects this 
strategy will eventually support development of improved 
illicit small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) national ac-
tion plans, by which the stockpile-management section is 
frequently underdeveloped.
Within the assessment, MAG also included stakeholder 
mapping and analysis in order to identify the activities and as-
sistance already occurring, and the individuals, departments 
or organizations whose involvement is critical to successful 
programming. By including stakeholder mapping, MAG en-
sures complementary support and avoids overlap or duplicat-
ed efforts.
Replication of Good Practice
Needs-based assessments led by national authorities that 
incorporate stakeholder mapping are an example of good 
practice that can be replicated, precisely because they ensure 
tailored assistance to specific contexts. Comparing programs 
in various African countries illustrates this. In Mali, numer-
ous national authorities and state-security providers iden-
tified an enormous need to address insecure weapons and 
munitions stores, as well as destroy unserviceable and obso-
lete weapons and munitions while assisting in the develop-
ment of national capacity.
A large number of assistance providers are also available, 
including the United Nations, European Union, bilateral mil-
itary aid and international nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO). A stakeholder-mapping approach and close coordina-
tion with donors and other assistance providers reduces over-
lap and increases interorganizational cooperation. In Burkina 
Faso, there has been a high level of engagement by the nation-
al authorities. However, a similar range of actors providing 
assistance does not currently exist. As the only international 
assistance provider, MAG’s programming focuses on specific 
technical support and the development of a nationwide assis-
tance plan to deliver and prioritize activities.
As the only AMD assistance provider in Chad, MAG is at 
an earlier stage of development and conducted a nationwide 
assessment of armories with the Gendarmerie and Garde 
A MAG team conducts a technical armory assessment with the Gendarmerie in Koulikoro, Mali. MAG conducted technical assess-
ments in Koulikoro in September 2014. After presenting its recommendations to the authorities and defining priority interventions, 
MAG began implementing AMD activities in Mali in early 2015.
A weapon is issued after being logged out of an armory in 
Ségou.
26
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol20/iss1/1
27ISSUE 20.1 @ MARCH 2016
Nationale et Nomade du Tchad. This aims to act as the basis 
for future operational activity while also developing trust and 
demonstrating to other state-security providers the benefits of 
AMD programming.
MAG has conducted AMD programming in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo for nearly a decade. MAG’s longer-term 
presence led to a high degree of trust and partnership with 
the armed forces and police. A weapons-destruction facili-
ty in Kinshasa, established with funding from the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of 
State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), runs 
under national management with minimal technical over-
sight. MAG’s assistance also included support to the devel-
opment of national technical guidelines led by the European 
Communications Security Evaluation Agency working group.
These programs are just a few examples of how AMD pro-
gramming is tailored specifically to the local context, need 
and capacity while also complementing other avenues of as-
sistance. These examples demonstrate how good practice and 
replication of AMD programs should focus on the approach 
taken rather than assuming that a successful project in one 
country can be replicated with guaranteed success.
When AMD involves the safe and secure storage of ammu-
nition, the IATGs reflect this approach to good practice. The 
IATGs aim to provide a global, guiding framework that in-
forms development of standards and implementation practic-
es at the national level. Context-specific approaches are built 
into their structure, as is the principle of incremental good 
practice across three levels.1
Within the IATGs, MAG’s assistance focuses on support-
ing states to achieve Level 1, which will make progress toward 
preventing unplanned explosions and diverting munitions to 
illicit markets in even the most challenging contexts. Projects 
based on assessments that involve relevant national authori-
ties and consider wider stakeholders, programming and assis-
tance have the best chance of success.
Where Next?
By the time this article is published, a number of important 
meetings involving stakeholders in the AMD sector will have 
convened, particularly a meeting on ammunition life cycle 
management (hosted in Switzerland) as well as efforts to im-
prove coordination in the Greater Sahel, led by Germany and 
the African Union. These discussions are unlikely to change 
As part of a request from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), MAG worked with the Malian Defence Security Forces 
(MDSF) from October 2014 to destroy more than 10,000 weapons. MAG completed the destruction in January 2015. Before com-
mencing the cutting of weapons, MAG provided training in weapons cutting in October 2014 for 12 personnel identified by MDSF.
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the scope of AMD assistance activities significantly, as ac-
tivities will continue to focus on destruction of conventional 
weapons; construction and rehabilitation of armories and ex-
plosive stores; and training and capacity building of nation-
al authorities, security agencies and armed forces. However, 
these will be vital steps in defining the future direction of the 
AMD sector by concentrating on coordination in AMD pro-
gramming, defining end states for international assistance, 
programming effectiveness, and measuring success and sus-
tainability.
The period ahead is important for further developing an 
AMD sector separate from mine action and where program-
ming approaches can continue to evolve and improve. The 
AMD sector must deepen its understanding of how assistance 
efforts support conflict prevention and broader security- 
sector reform efforts. To be successful, we must continue to 
develop a culture that embraces critical self-reflection while 
deepening and broadening dialogue and partnership. 
See endnotes page 66
MAG’s arms management and destruction work in Mali is 
supported by the German Federal Foreign Office, who along 
with PM/WRA, fund MAG’s Sahel-West Africa program.
Major Arme Amoya, storekeeper, Ségou Police. “I am very happy with the container and the way it is organized. All gun racks have 
padlocks. The training went very well and I learned a lot. I am from the old school and I didn’t receive any training. I became a 
storekeeper because of trust rather than training. Now I am trained, I was recently promoted to work in a bigger armory. I will 
make sure to pass on my knowledge to my replacement—but I will keep the manual MAG gave me.”
Chris Loughran
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MAG, Mines Advisory Group
Tel:+441612364311
Email: chris.loughran@maginternational.org 
Website: www.maginternational.org
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In the Spotlight
EASTERN EUROPE
 AND THE CAUCUSES
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GICHD’s Eastern Europe, Caucasus and  
Central Asia Outreach Programme
by Faiz Paktian [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Within the Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia (EECCA) region, fifteen countries affect-ed by landmines and/or explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) use Russian as a communication language: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Mines and ERW pose a 
serious hazard to the lives and livelihoods of the people in the 
EECCA. Residual contamination impacts many of the coun-
tries. In Belarus for instance, 20,879 items of unexploded ord-
nance (UXO) were found and destroyed in 2014.1 Significant 
amounts of UXO were also recovered from Estonia, Moldova 
and Russia. More recent conflicts led to considerable mine 
and ERW contamination in countries such as Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Ukraine, 
clearance priorities from the current conflict superseded 
clearance of WWII ERW. In 2014, 36,500 items of UXO in the 
areas of Donetsk and Luhansk were reportedly destroyed.
Aging and poorly managed ammunition stores also result-
ed in numerous unplanned explosions that killed many civil-
ians living close to depots in several of the EECCA countries. 
Furthermore, insurgents use poorly secured or abandoned am-
munition as sources of highly explosive material for the pro-
duction of improvised explosive devices. To improve human 
security and the safety of civilian populations in EECCA, 
clearing mines and scattered items of ERW is imperative as 
well as securing and managing all ammunition stores to rec-
ognized international standards.
In June 2015, the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) established a platform of 
affected states and regional organizations to advance human 
security across the region through improvements in the mine 
EECCA workshop participants visit the ERW response center of the Ministry of Interior of Belarus. 
Photo courtesy of GICHD.
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action sector. The purpose of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus, 
and Central Asia  Outreach Programme (EECCA-OP) for 
mine/ERW action is to promote safe and efficient imple-
mentation of mine/ERW action projects and programs, to 
enhance regional cooperation through information and ex-
perience sharing, and to embed the best mine/ERW action 
practices throughout the region. The EECCA program will 
assist national mine action authorities and local operators 
to accelerate capacity development through access to inter-
national standards, training material and advisory services 
in a more accessible language.
First EECCA Regional Workshop in Minsk
GICHD, in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 
Belarus, organized the first regional workshop in Minsk 
9–12 June 2015. Thirty-five participants from 10 countries 
and representatives from international organizations active 
in the region attended the workshop.
Workshop objectives were as follows:
• Assess and thereby understand the scope of the mine/
ERW problem and the challenges faced by different 
countries in the region.
• Promote best practices and share lessons learned 
in ammunition-safety management and mine/
ERW action.
• Enhance cooperation in planning and implement-
ing mine/ERW action programs among all states in 
the region.
• Discuss priorities and initiate regional workshops 
and activities that benefit mine/ERW programs and 
military personnel in the EECCA region.
Workshop Recommendations
 The workshop concluded with the following recommen-
dations for GICHD’s EECCA-OP:
• Establish a mine action website for EECCA in the  
Russian language.
• Translate International Mine Action Standards  
(IMAS), International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG) and other relevant  
documents into Russian.
• Hold a regional, annual gathering for EECCA  
countries and partners to review progress  
and establish priorities.
• Invite countries absent during the first EECCA 
gathering, such as Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Mongolia and Uzbekistan, to future gatherings.
• Organize a visit for the national authorities to a well- 
established mine action program in the region.
• Offer technical regional workshops in Russian on the 
following topics: development of national law and stan-
dards, IMAS application, strategic/annual planning, 
ERW survey and clearance, ammunition-safety man-
agement, accreditation and contracting, risk education, 
and victim assistance.
Action Plan 2016
GICHD’s EECCA-OP plans to deliver the following 
in 2016:
A mine action website in Russian. The website will be a 
platform to post and disseminate mine action information and 
news, including up-to-date information on mine action pro-
grams and topics in the Russian language. Russian-speaking 
visitors can sign up for news and information as well as partic-
ipate in discussions on mine action issues. The purpose of the 
website is to make essential mine action information and doc-
uments available in Russian, and to promote common mine 
action terminology and best practices throughout the region. 
GICHD will be responsible for maintenance and content.
Translation of IMAS and IATG into Russian. IMAS, 
IATGs, and the associated documents and tools in the 
Russian language will increase understanding and promote 
a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine 
action operations and ammunition-safety management. They 
will assist the national authorities to adopt best practice, de-
velop national standards and assist implementing organiza-
tions to improve standing operating procedures. As a result, 
these will contribute to the safety, efficiency and quality of 
mine action operations and ammunition-safety management 
in the region.
Field seminar to the mine action program in Azerbaijan. 
A visit to the mine action program in Azerbaijan in consul-
tation with the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Authority 
is planned for 2016. Its purpose is to expose the countries of 
EECCA to an established mine action program in the region. 
During the visit, representatives of mine/ERW action pro-
grams and military personnel engaged in humanitarian tasks 
will have the opportunity to exchange views and experiences 
on all aspects of management and field operations, including 
risk education and victim assistance.
Organization of a side event during the National 
Directors Meeting. GICHD will organize a side event at the 
International Meeting of National Programme Directors 
and U.N. Advisors in Geneva. Representatives of EECCA 
countries at the meeting will be invited to share ideas and 
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The GICHD supports national authorities, international and regional organisations and NGOs in their efforts to improve the relevance and performance of mine action. It serves as the leading multi-lingual knowledge hub
for mine action practitioners. The GICHD furthers knowledge and promotes norms and standards in Russian, fostering regional and intersectoral cooperation.
Disclaimer: The map above is for illustrative purposes and does not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the GICHD concerning the legal status of any country or territory or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries. Some countries/territories highlighted in this map may not have landmine/ERW contamination.           © GICHD 2016
Figure 1. Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA) Outreach Programme. The GICHD supports national authorities, 
international and regional organizations and NGOs in their efforts to improve the relevance and performance of mine action. It 
serves as the leading multi-lingual knowledge hub for mine action practitioners. The GICHD furthers knowledge and promotes 
norms and standards in Russian, fostering regional and intersectoral cooperation. Disclaimer: The map above is for illustrative 
purposes and does not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the GICHD concerning the legal status of any country 
or territory or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries. Some countries/territories highlighted in this map may not 
have landmine/ERW contamination. 
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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thoughts on upcoming events and the future of the EECCA-
OP. The event is a valuable opportunity in February 2016 to 
inform the group about its activities and encourage finan-
cial, in-kind and academic contributions of the partners, as 
well as review progress and plans.
Second EECCA Annual Conference
The second EECCA annual gathering is planned for the 
second half of 2016. In this event, national authorities in the 
region will not only discuss progress made but also share 
lessons learned, future challenges, and updates on mine ac-
tion operations and ammunition-safety management. The 
needs of the programs will be assessed in order to identify pri-
orities for 2017.
Technical Workshop 
GICHD will organize a technical workshop in an EECCA 
country with a focus on norms, standards and legislation. 
Countries will share their norms and laws with regard to mine 
action and ammunition-safety management as well as discuss 
challenges and lessons learned regarding these topics. 
See endnotes page 66
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Unfinished Business: Cluster Munition  
Remnants in Kosovo
by Dr. Darvin Lisica and Dr. Stuart Maslen [ Norwegian People’s Aid ] 
During the period of June 1999 to mid-December 2001, the United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) coordinated ma-
jor international cleanup activities in 
Kosovo, which resulted in the successful 
clearance of more than 12.4 sq mi (32.1 
sq km) of land and the destruction of 
more than 50,000 landmines, unexplod-
ed submunitions and other unexploded 
ordnance (UXO). Kosovo had consid-
erable mine and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) contamination, includ-
ing cluster munition remnants (CMR) 
from armed conflict between forces of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
the Kosovo Liberation Army in the late 
1990s, exacerbated by the NATO bomb-
ing in 1999.
Time has shown how much remains 
to be cleared (and sometimes re-cleared). 
At the time of the U.N. program’s clo-
sure on 15 December 2001, 47 task dos-
siers remained. Despite years of further 
clearance, a community liaison survey 
completed by The HALO Trust in 2007 
identified 172 mine or ERW clearance 
tasks.1 The national authorities, then 
the Office for the Kosovo Protection 
Corps Coordinator (OKPCC), advised 
by the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), dis-
counted 42 of these tasks after re-survey. 
However, HALO’s clearance operations 
in 2009 continued to find contamina-
tion in other areas that OKPCC did not 
consider dangerous.2 By the end of 2014, 128 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) re-
mained in the IMSMA database held by the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC), 
covering a total area of almost 4.1 sq mi (10.6 sq km).3 Of this total, contamination 
from CMR was strewn across 51 areas covering more than 2.9 sq mi (7.5 sq km), in-
cluding majority Serb areas in northern Kosovo.4,5
In 2014, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) established a new program in Kosovo 
and took a careful look at CMR in northern Kosovo (specifically the four munici-
palities of Leposavić, Mitrovica North, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan). From December 
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Figure 1. Cluster munition strike zones in northern Kosovo identified by NPA.
All graphics courtesy of NPA.
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2014 through July 2015, NPA conducted desk study and field-
based, non-technical survey (NTS) to assess and confirm 
CMR contamination. These activities were done in partner-
ship with local authorities and KMAC.
NPA identified cluster munition strikes in nine affect-
ed communities across three of the four municipalities 
(Leposavić, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan). Four types of clus-
ter munitions were identified: CBU-87/B (in three versions, 
dispersing BLU-97, BLU-97B or BLU-97A/B submunitions), 
CBU-99 (dispersing MK-118 BL submunitions), BL-755 (dis-
persing MK-1 submunitions) and RBL-755 (dispersing MK-4 
submunitions). Records of unexploded submunitions clear-
ance by the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
were provided to NPA by KMAC, indicat-
ing total clearance on four tasks at one loca-
tion (Mokra Gora) in 1999 and 2006 of some 
750,000 sq yards (632,800 sq m)—though it 
is unclear if these clearance operations were 
conducted in accordance with international 
mine action standards.6
During this planned clearance, 119 un-
exploded submunitions were found and de-
stroyed, while KFOR units destroyed 299 
additional submunitions in spot tasks after 
calls from local communities. The majority 
of these 276 submunitions were found in Žaža 
community in Zvečan municipality in 2000. 
In 2015, KFOR reported the latest incident, a single unexplod-
ed submunition in Oklace, Zubin Potok municipality.
Available information suggests that during the bomb-
ing campaigns, 83 cluster bombs were dropped at 30 loca-
tions within the three municipalities, dispersing a total of 
17,041 submunitions. NPA estimated that 1,459 unexploded 
submunitions remained (8.56 percent of those fired overall), 
indicating up to 1,000 or more still need to be cleared from 
almost 9 sq km of land (3.4 sq mi). These figures are in addi-
tion to the already significant KMAC estimates of contami-
nation cited previously.
Boljetin is one of the affected communities situated in the 
southeast of Zvečan municipality, where most of the land is 
forested or pasture. The community has a population of ap-
proximately 350, of whom only about 45 citizens are perma-
nently employed.6 Most of the unemployed exploit the forest, 
use the pasture, or conduct agricultural and orchard work as 
their main source of income. No data were available on NATO 
bombing of the community. During NTS, NPA received infor-
mation from local authorities and from the field that NATO 
had bombed one location on Sokolica Hill. Municipality au-
thorities confirmed this information, which stated that det-
onations occurred due to a forest fire in July 2007 north of 
Sokolica monastery.
Based on information received locally, NPA confirmed two 
NATO strikes in the community. The local population con-
firmed they feared entering the area surrounding Boljetin vil-
lage and Sokolica monastery. The police station in Zvečan was 
also informed by paragliders that they noticed unexploded 
submunitions from the air. The total hazardous area is 0.06 sq 
mi (0.15 sq km) or about 30 soccer fields. NPA estimated that 
at least two RBL-755 cluster bombs were dropped, dispersing 
Unexploded BLU-97 submunition at Tovariste in Zaˇzaˇ commu-
nity, Zvecan municipality.
Unexploded BLU-97 A/B submunition at Crni Krs in Oklace community, Zubin 
Potok municipality.
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MK-4 submunitions. NPA estimated that 30 MK-4 submuni-
tions remained for clearance.
Although KFOR emergency interventions reduced the 
hazard level at certain locations across the region, serious 
risks for the local population still exist, and risks are growing 
as local communities in northern Kosovo begin using the land 
more extensively for economic development. Analysis shows 
that across northern Kosovo, mountainous areas intended for 
tourism (a key development potential for the region) amount-
ed to 42.5 percent of the total contamination identified. 
Agricultural land (24.8 percent) and forests (23.2 percent) are 
also highly impacted. The remaining impacts were on areas 
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A child finds parts of a BLU-97 submunition in Oklace, Zubin 
Potok municipality.
used or intended for housing, infrastructure, river banks and 
canals. In total, assessments indicate that 3,872 people are im-
pacted by the presence of unexploded submunitions with 995 
people at direct risk of death or injury.
Based on its assessment of the CMR hazard and impact, 
NPA plans to develop a land-release strategy for contaminat-
ed areas across all of northern Kosovo, including areas with 
Serbian and Albanian majorities. More than 15 years after 
cluster bombs were dropped, northern Kosovo still faces a 
major clearance challenge. 
See endnotes page 66
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Provision of Emergency Risk Education 
to IDPs and Returnees in Ukraine
by Abigail Jones and Edward Crowther [ Danish Demining Group/Danish Refugee Council ]
While no official survey of the landmine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) situation has been carried out in Ukraine, the humanitarian impact is sig-
nificant. Mines and booby traps strategically block access to 
essential infrastructure as well as to forested areas where peo-
ple gather wood to heat their homes. Important infrastruc-
ture across the Donbas region, one of Europe’s most heavily 
industrialized areas, is contaminated, slowing repairs and re-
construction around power stations and water-treatment fa-
cilities, and seriously affecting the local population. Similarly, 
cluster munition use in urban and rural areas blocks access to 
family allotments and farms.
The media, humanitarian nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and civilian volunteer networks report mine/ERW 
casualties in Ukraine. Different government ministries for-
mally collect data on these incidents, but it is not available 
publically. Although no clear baseline exists, the number of ca-
sualties from mine/ERW accidents has risen in recent months 
as internally displaced persons (IDPs) start to return home, 
and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of essential infra-
structure has taken place. Danish Demining Group’s (DDG) 
informal monitoring of open-source news and data suggests 
that since May 2014 at least 338 reported accidents occurred 
involving mines/ERW, with 41 children and 686 adults killed 
or injured. 
A Results-based Approach to MRE
DDG has, over the last 18 months, begun a global change 
in the way it understands and provides mine risk educa-
tion (MRE), as explained in a presentation entitled “More 
than Posters” by Tammy Hall, head of DDG, at the 17th 
International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme 
Volunteers conduct an MRE session with children, 2015.
Photo courtesy of Sasha Lobov.
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Directors and U.N. Advisers in Geneva in February 2015. An 
earlier article by DDG Chief Technical Advisor Robert Keeley 
in The Journal of ERW and Mine Action (Issue 19.2, July 2015), 
describes the principles of this approach.1 The DDG MRE pro-
gram in Ukraine is results-based, and has in turn fed back 
into DDG’s understanding of how to plan and conduct MRE 
in other programs.
Implementing the Knowledge, Attitudes and  
Practice Survey
Through a grant funded by the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), DDG carried out a knowledge, attitudes and 
practices survey (KAP) in April 2015, to ensure that MRE 
messages and methodologies target the needs and capacities of 
different categories of risk takers in the community. The KAP 
survey included the following target groups:
• IDPs: Adults and children displaced as a result of the 
conflict, residing in government-controlled areas. IDPs 
have settled across the country, with the most vulner-
able living in collective centers.
• Returnees: Adults and children in the process of re-
turning to conflict-affected areas under government 
control. Back-and-forth movement and returns contin-
ue to be reported from the field, as IDPs and refugees 
return to secure property, assess the conflict environ-
ment and visit relatives either unwilling or unable to 
leave the conflict zone.
• Residents: Adults and children residing in conflict- 
affected areas under government control, including 
residents in their place of origin. In terms of residents, 
limited data is available to show how many people 
stayed in the regions where the highest intensity fight-
ing took place.
The KAP focused on identifying MRE needs for each af-
fected group, particularly for children aged six to 11 and 12 
to 17. While the main focus of the KAP survey was to identi-
fy children’s MRE needs, surveyors also took the opportunity 
to understand more about the risk-taking behaviors of adults.
In total, the KAP survey covered 699 individual inter-
viewees in the government-controlled areas of Luhansk and 
Donetsk oblasts. Broad categories of target groups inter-
viewed included a total of 341 IDPs (48.8 percent), 348 res-
idents (49.8 percent) and 10 returnees (1.4 percent) in both 
Training of KAP survey enumerators in Severodonetsk, Ukraine, 2015.
Photo courtesy of Olena Sadovniko.
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oblasts. In Luhansk, 215 were IDPs, 132 were residents and 
three were returnees, while Donetsk had 125 IDPs, 216 resi-
dents and seven returnees. The total sample consisted of 397 
(57 percent) female and 302 (43 percent) male respondents.
In eastern Ukraine, the KAP confirmed boys and girls 
from ages six to 11 are the least aware of the dangers posed 
by mines/ERW, since a high percentage (42.8 percent) can-
not properly identify dangerous items and do not know what 
is appropriate, safe behavior. The KAP also established that 
all adult groups and children from the ages of 12 to 17 may 
be treated as uninformed due to insufficient knowledge about 
how to handle victims of mine/ERW accidents. A low number 
of respondents (1 percent), typically males from the ages of 12 
to 17 and 35 to 59, admitted recklessness. However, analysis of 
available data on casualties demonstrates that many of the ac-
cidents were a result of reckless behavior. Equally, males and 
females ages 18 to 60 stated survival as justification for their 
unsafe behavior, citing activities such as farming, grazing 
cattle, going to work and gathering firewood. This behavior 
places these groups in the category of intentional. Elderly men 
ages 60 and over may, as a result of the available data, be char-
acterized as misinformed.
Using the Results of the KAP
The findings of the KAP were used to develop an approach 
that aims to increase safety and security of school-aged chil-
dren and their parents in and around learning spaces and 
schools by increasing awareness of mines/ERW. Utilizing the 
results of the KAP survey ensured that emphasis was placed 
on key messages covering identified gaps in knowledge among 
the target population. For example, the KAP determined that 
knowledge about mine warning signs was insufficient, and 
emphasis on this has been included in the training. Moreover, 
many KAP respondents could not recite the correct number 
to call for the Ukrainian State Emergency Services to report 
mines /ERW; this has also been given strong emphasis.
Training of trainers for Luhansk Oblast school teachers, 2015.
Photo courtesy of Edward Crowther.
In eastern Ukraine, the KAP confirmed boys and girls from ages six to 11  
are the least aware of the dangers posed by mines/ERW
“
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The project is ongoing and includes five core activities:
• Training of up to 100 teachers and school psycholo-
gists as trainers in partnership with the Ministry of 
Education to ensure that IDP and returnee children are 
provided with MRE-integrated school activities. So far, 
84 teachers and school psychologists across the eastern 
oblasts most heavily affected by the conflict have re-
ceived training. 
• Training of up to 127 volunteers from Ukrainian NGOs, 
church-based groups and other community-based or-
ganizations working in conflict-hit communities across 
the eastern oblasts. 
• Peer educators in summer camps were trained to en-
sure the active participation of youth in MRE activities. 
Summer camps across Ukraine are places where large 
numbers of IDP children are sent during the summer, and 
training summer-camp peer educators can provide these 
children with MRE in an efficient and entertaining way. 
• Innovating mine action through Mine Action Appli-
cations (MApps). DDG is designing, developing and 
piloting an innovative two-way communication web 
portal and parallel SMS service that aims to improve 
the service provision and information exchange be-
tween conflict-affected people and the mine action op-
erators assisting these communities. MApps Ukraine is 
part of a global pilot project on digital applications for 
mine action.
• In collaboration with UNICEF Ukraine, DDG is 
working to design and disseminate an information- 
education campaign through TV as well as digital and 
print materials to raise awareness on mine/ERW risks 
and to promote safe practices. The KAP survey indicat-
ed a desire to receive MRE messages via channels such 
as TV and social media.
DDG also works closely with UNICEF in Ukraine in or-
der to standardize the child- and adult-focused MRE mate-
rials used by organizations providing MRE across Ukraine. 
In this respect, the KAP survey is invaluable in driving the 
design of such materials.
Despite these activities, the amount of MRE provided in 
the eastern oblasts of Ukraine is insufficient, and DDG re-
ceives daily demands from communities and organizations 
in the conflict-affected areas to provide MRE training or 
sessions. Under a new EU€1.57 million (US$1,730,375 as of 
22 February 2016) European Union (EU)-funded project, 
DDG will significantly scale up its activities providing MRE 
across Donetsk and Luhansk, working with community- 
based organizations and the school system. Another as-
pect of the EU project will provide modern equipment and 
International Mine Action Standards-level training to py-
rotechnical units of the state emergency services working 
in the eastern oblasts.  
See endnotes page 66
DRC/DDG children’s MRE flipchart, 2015.
Photo courtesy of DDG Ukraine.
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Explosive Hazards in the Aftermath  
of Natural Disasters: Lessons Learned 
by Nicole Neitzey [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]  
  and Dr. Paula Daly [ James Madison University College of Business ]
N atural disasters have posed problems for demining operations in the past; the heavy flooding in Bosnia and Herzegovina was one recent example of many. 
Over the past 20 years, natural disasters have impacted coun-
tries affected by landmines or other explosive remnants of 
war (ERW), causing renewed danger. Figure 1 lists the main 
challenges faced in situations such as these. Despite reoccur-
ring in recent years, these events continue catching the inter-
national CWD community by surprise, while experience and 
lessons learned from previous disasters in one country must 
be relearned in other regions.
With the flooding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, experts re-
alized that 15 years of clearance progress could be effectively 
washed away in a matter of hours. As shown in Figure 1, a di-
saster in an area contaminated with explosives can affect ev-
erything from trade routes to peoples’ lives and livelihoods. 
The issues at hand include how to reassess the ERW threat, 
how to minimize loss of life and cost, how best to educate the 
public and relief workers of potential dangers, how to reprior-
itize the deployment of ERW-clearance assets, and when and 
how to determine if areas are safe for displaced populations 
to return. With such high stakes, it is imperative that we as a 
community do our best in planning for the possibility of a di-
saster disrupting normal operations.
ERW in the Immediate Aftermath of Natural  
Disasters: A Complex Problem
Following flooding in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014 
that some experts feared would significantly set back the 
country’s ERW clearance program, the Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) asked the 
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) 
to research the issue. The main purpose was to incorpo-
rate the findings into a training module for CISR’s Senior 
Managers’ Course in ERW and Mine Action to help CWD 
program managers understand and prepare for the issue of 
natural disasters interrupting their operations.
Landmines and other ERW affect the lives and livelihoods 
of people in more than 60 countries or territories world-
wide.10 Lingering conflict and renewed hostilities in unstable 
parts of the world mean that new threats from landmines, 
unexploded munitions and improvised explosives often con-
tinue to arise. Natural disasters similarly pose grave risks to 
people’s lives, communities and societies. An average of 388 
Hurricane Mitch (1998) Honduras and Nicaragua
• Demining operations halted for roughly a month while resources were diverted to 
emergency relief
• Infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) destroyed
• Mines shift, clearance requires more time and resources
• Demining equipment lost1
Massive Floods (2000) Mozambique
• Mines migrate from marked areas to those previously deemed safe
• Over 200,000 people lost their homes
• Additional resources needed 
• New national plan needed to identify and prioritize new hazards2,3
Flash Floods (2010) Pakistan
• Floods carry mines from mountains to nearby tribal area
• Individuals unaware of dangers touch explosives, causing injuries4
Heavy rains cause ﬂ oods (2011) Sri Lanka
• Landmines/ERW previously buried dislodged and moved
• Resurveying needed to assess hazard areas and severity5
Heavy rains ﬂ ood border area (2012) Peru/Chile
• Border closed when mines surface on the roadway be-tween the two countries, halt-
ing all trade along this route6
Flooding (2013) Cambodia
• Due to the sheer number of mines,, fears that migrated mines would resettle in new 
areas before all could be found7
Floods / landslides from extreme rain (2014) Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Tens of thousands of mines displaced
• Reports of mines and ERW shifting from marked areas to unknown locations
• Safe roads for relief and debris clearance teams to travel not immediately clear8,9
Figure 1. Major challenges of past natural disasters in ERW- 
affected areas.
Figure courtesy of authors.
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Landmine Contamination
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Geophysical and Hydro
Drought and Geophysical
Drought, Hydro and Geophysical
Figure 2. The map highlights countries affected by ERW 
and areas at risk from natural disasters (includes earth-
quakes, volcanoes, floods, cyclones and landslides).
Figure courtesy of ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor, Mines Action Canada, 
World Bank and CISR.
natural disasters was observed annually from 2003 to 2012 
with more than 106,000 people killed by natural disasters on 
average each year during the same time period.11 Economic 
damages of disasters average tens of billions of dollars per 
year globally.11 Conflicts and disasters cause people to flee 
their homes: A 2014 report on effects of natural disasters 
states “almost 22 million people were [newly] displaced in at 
least 119 countries [in 2013], almost three times as many as 
were newly displaced by conflict and violence.”12 The num-
ber of people newly displaced by conflict is only a small piece 
of the picture, as conflicts often linger for long periods. In 
2013, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
estimated that more than 51 million people were considered 
forcibly displaced globally—an aggregate figure that includes 
those remaining in a state of displacement from previous 
years and is the highest number on record since these fig-
ures were tracked.13 Estimates indicate that less than 2 mil-
lion people were able to return home in 2013, and more than 
6 million fall into the category of a “protracted refugee situa-
tion,” having been displaced for five years or more.13
Compounding the threat of disasters in ERW-affected 
areas is the fact that their frequency and impact have risen 
over the past three decades and are predicted to increase.14 
A 2011 Oxfam research report posits that the increase in the 
number of disasters is partially attributable to global climate 
change, and escalated impact is tied in part to population 
growth.14 Vulnerability, defined as being “affected by eco-
nomic, social, physical, environmental or political conditions, 
which increase the susceptibility of a community to the im-
pact of hazards,” also plays a role in exposure.14 Clearly coun-
tries devastated by war and still recovering from the effects of 
leftover explosives would fall into the “vulnerable” category. A 
2014 report by the Norwegian Refugee Council further details 
the overlap of conflict-affected regions with natural disasters 
in recent years: “In 33 out of 36 countries affected by armed 
conflict between 2008 and 2012, there were also reports of 
natural hazards forcing people to flee their homes.”12 Further, 
the displaced may be forced to move to areas that expose them 
to additional risk, magnifying their vulnerability.12
Countries in these situations often have limited capa-
bilities at the national level to respond to either their resid-
ual ERW problem or the aftermath of a natural disaster as 
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an isolated problem—let alone the combination of the two.15 
Nations heavily affected by ERW are typically highly reliant 
on international support (at least in terms of funding and 
sometimes technical capacity), and international recovery ef-
forts for disasters in developing countries function in much 
the same way—led by external donors and relief workers. 
Unless previously engaged in operations under conditions in-
volving ERW dangers, external actors entering to provide aid 
following a natural disaster may be unaware of the potential 
hazards. Figure 2 illustrates the large amount of overlap be-
tween countries vulnerable to disasters and those affected by 
ERW contamination.
Disaster Management:  
A Framework for Addressing Risk
A robust history of planning and implementing responses 
to mine/ERW cleanup and natural disasters exists; the two 
are largely separate fields, but each can inform the situation 
that occurs when the two overlap. The literature on natural 
disasters identifies four phases of disaster management: pre-
vention (or mitigation), preparedness, response and recovery 
(see Figure 3).15 Experts believe that governments and orga-
nizations should address all four phases to adequately tackle 
natural disaster risk.15 At issue are matters such as gathering 
information, coordination, prioritization, redefining impact 
and needs, roles of different actors, providing appropriate 
training, interruptions to operations, cost, emergency pub-
lic information campaigns, international assistance, ensuring 
the safety of relief workers vis-à-vis explosive hazards, and 
integrating CWD programs with larger relief efforts. In ad-
dition to these concerns of preparedness and response is the 
possibility that some risks could be avoided or prevented.
Additionally, aspects of disaster preparedness can assist 
in understanding ERW emergencies related to natural di-
sasters. Such topics as immediate relief mobilization, lines 
of authority, information gathering, interorganizational co-
ordination and public information campaigns/educational 
aspects can be overlaid with the explosives issue, as similar 
concerns are in both areas. Since a strong history of disas-
ter planning and preparation is evident in various countries 
worldwide, this topic not only helps us understand the prob-
lem at hand but also provides potential solutions to mirror in 
the field of CWD within the context of natural disasters. The 
U.N.’s International Strategy for Disaster Reduction provides 
a useful framework for considering the relevant issues based 
on its stated goals for disaster and risk reduction in which it 
strives for increased public awareness of risks, commitment by 
public authorities to risk reduction, engaged involvement of 
the public in risk reduction, and reduced economic and social 
losses due to natural disasters.16 These areas can be translated 
to the issue of ERW hazards in the wake of natural disasters to 
provide a holistic response to ERW in the aftermath of a cata-
strophic natural event.
Risk Management and Organizational  
Continuity: Managing Large-scale  
Disruptive Events
Working with CWD personnel means working with man-
agers who routinely try to accomplish their organizational 
goals in high-risk environments or situations. On a regular 
basis CWD employees may face physical danger from unex-
ploded ordnance, political instability, hostile environmen-
tal elements or sudden loss of funding. Handling large-scale 
disruptive events (i.e., crises) is an additional complexity for 
managers and other personnel who already cope with unique 
challenges in their work environment. The primary goal of in-
corporating risk management into the managerial training 
component of CISR’s Senior Managers’ Course is to help man-
agers develop the knowledge base and skill set that allow them 
to achieve the mission of their organization regardless of dis-
ruptions that happen along the way.
The concept of organizational continuity is borrowed 
from business continuity literature and modified to fit non-
business entities. Continuity management is an approach that 
identifies potential disruptive events and provides a frame-
work for building resilience, which is an organization’s ability 
to withstand the impact of a major disruptive event. Effective 
response to such an event means that an organization has the 
capability to respond in a way that protects key stakeholders, 
Preparedness Response
RecoveryMitigation
Crisis
Figure 3. The four phases of disaster risk management.
Figure courtesy of http://securipedia.eu/.
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value-creating activities, the environment, and organization-
al integrity and reputation. Organizational continuity and 
risk management are closely linked and mutually dependent. 
Risk management tends to be more preventive in nature and 
provides important inputs for managing organizational con-
tinuity. Managing continuity goes beyond risk management 
to include in-depth planning on how to deal with events and 
their consequences.
Understanding risk is the starting place for organizational 
continuity and the effective management of disruptive events. 
A key principle underlying risk management is that risk can-
not be eliminated but can be controlled. The amount and type 
of control exerted depends on the likelihood of the event oc-
curring and the magnitude of impact (or loss) associated with 
the risk. Although risk can sometimes be quantified, often the 
information needed to do so is either unavailable or too ex-
pensive to collect. Risk analysis is the process of identifying 
events, determining causes, and estimating probabilities and 
impacts. It includes the following steps:
• Identify significant threats to critical operations.
• Identify and evaluate current controls.
• Estimate event probabilities.
• Estimate impacts.
• Utilize a risk measure combining impact  
and probability
• Prioritize risks and determine treatment.
The organizational continuity approach ties crisis manage-
ment more closely to an organization’s overall strategic plan. 
To effectively manage disruptive events and build resilience, 
managers must understand how these events impact the activ-
ities critical to the organization’s mission. An organizational 
impact analysis addresses three critical questions: 
• What are our primary objectives? 
• What deliverables are critical to our organizational 
purpose? 
• What resources are critical to our ability to continue 
producing those deliverables?
Disaster Risk in ERW-affected Areas:  
Identifying Risks
In order to adequately address the risk of disaster in 
ERW-affected areas, protocols are needed to deal with risks 
in a systematic way. Using the disaster-management frame-
work in Figure 3, managers in CWD programs should think 
about resolutions in each phase to address risk. Consider what 
questions you, as a manager, need to ask in order to prepare 
for a disruptive event. Some of the recommended questions 
to consider within each of the four phases are outlined here.
Prevention/Mitigation. In the area of prevention/mitiga-
tion, remember that disasters typically cannot be prevented, 
but their impact can be mitigated. Managers should keep this 
fact in mind as they expand the use of this framework to other 
types of risk as well, since opportunities may arise to lessen 
the effects of a risk rather than prevent it entirely. Mitigation 
should not be ignored, even if prevention is out of the organi-
zation’s control.
• What can be done in advance of a disruptive event to 
lessen the impact of its effects?
• Can clearance prioritization take into account which 
areas disasters are likely to impact?
• Can important buildings and equipment be better pro-
tected from damage?
• How can we prevent loss of data/ensure uninterrupted 
access to data during a crisis?
Preparedness. Preparedness requires managers to consider 
what is needed to guarantee that the organization is prepared 
for response to a disruptive event. Preparations could involve 
information, plans, resources, tools, training or people.
• Who are the existing internal organizations for emer-
gency response? Who is the focal point? Is ERW re-
sponse represented?
• Do those coordinating the response know of PM/WRA 
and its implementing partners as a resource for explo-
sive hazards that may be encountered in the field? 
• What international organizations are likely to be in-
volved in the response? Who are the counterparts in 
neighboring countries?
• Would you know what to do in a disaster situation? 
Would staff know what is expected of them?
• What is the current clearance strategy, and how is it (or 
would it be) impacted?
• What is the disaster risk profile of the country (if avail-
able), and where can this information be found?
Response. Response is closely linked to preparedness 
and requires the manager to consider how to ensure the or-
ganization is capable of effectively responding to a disrup-
tive event.
• What lines of communication will be used?
• How can you avoid panic among the general population, 
Understanding risk is the starting place for organizational continuity  
and the effective management of disruptive events.
“
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as well as prevent/dispel misinformation or rumor?
• How would an emergency-clearance plan take shape? 
What mechanisms exist? What is required of assets and 
resources in the country?
• What information/resources are needed to develop/ 
execute the plan?  (e.g., satellite images, community 
input, etc.)
• What happens if the affected area is in dispute? Is there 
a neutral third party that needs to be called in?
Recovery. The recovery phase is the process of getting back 
to normal. In this stage the manager should consider what is 
needed to shift from the emergency-response phase back to 
normal operations.
• How can you communicate to the public that 
emergency-response operations are complete?
• Will ad hoc committees/networks or other groups con-
tinue to meet/communicate or disband?
• How can you ensure continued planning for the next 
disruptive event?
Best Practices and Lessons Learned  
for Planning
The overarching lesson that came out of this research was 
that we cannot wait until a crisis happens to figure out what 
we know or don’t know and what to do. Planning ahead for 
disruptions of any magnitude will help the CWD community 
better address such issues as they arise. Proaction rather than 
reaction is imperative when managing risks. With regard to 
the suggested framework, managers should map out a plan 
that addresses all four phases, translating the answers to the 
questions previously discussed or posed into specific proto-
cols and actions to take. Managers need to ensure they have 
considered all aspects of the organization’s operations (per-
sonnel, finances, communications, etc.). Also, keeping the 
plan updated is important. It should not be a static document 
to develop and then put on a shelf. Managers should review 
the plan annually or at the start of each new project to guar-
antee the information is kept up to date.
Our research in examining programs that previously dealt 
with natural disasters in ERW-contaminated areas brought to 
light some specific best practices and lessons learned in each 
of the four areas of the framework, listed below.
In regards to mitigation,
• Back up data off-site.
• Make sure data is not just recorded on paper.
• Determine if buildings can withstand a natural disaster, 
and identify measures to fortify them.
• Have an alternate site in mind as an operations base if 
structures are damaged.
• Consider prioritizing clearance of land more prone to 
disasters. Overlay suspected hazardous area maps with 
those of areas impacted in the past by disasters.
Concerning preparedness,
• Identify existing organizations/points of contact for 
emergency response (national and international levels).
• Become familiar with national laws on disaster re-
sponse, and any existing national or local emergency 
plans.
• Understand the resources available for a disaster- 
response effort (within and outside the organization). 
Understand local capabilities and challenges or gaps. 
• Consider what risk-management strategies could be 
employed—have a plan in place.
• Train staff and educate those likely to be involved in the 
response on how your organization can help.
• Consider running simulations to practice for an actual 
disaster situation (similar to practicing for other emer-
gencies, such as injury in the field).
In relation to response,
• Communication and coordination are imperative to 
successful response with different organizations, inter-
national actors and other countries affected.
• Utilize your resources—existing infrastructure, mech-
anisms and equipment (e.g., schools, community-liai-
son teams) can gather and disseminate information.
• Know how to request assistance from donors (e.g., PM/
WRA provides assistance through its Quick Reaction 
Force) and what their role is likely to be.
• Use available technologies to assist (e.g., satellite imag-
es, drones).
• Ensure donors are aware of how your resources may 
need to shift to aid in the response.
• Know where you can go to obtain the information  
you need.
• Write a sample emergency-clearance plan.
Regarding recovery,
• Develop a transition plan for gradually moving resourc-
es (people, assets) not needed for response back to regu-
lar operations.
... we cannot wait until a crisis happens to figure out what 
we know or don’t know and what to do.
“
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• Ensure communication occurs as necessary with the 
public, media, etc., so all are aware that emergency 
response is complete.
• Assess what worked and didn’t work with manage-
ment plans for disruptive events.
• Ensure lessons learned from the other phases are in-
corporated into future plans and protocols.
Conclusion
Although this article looked at risk through the lens of 
disaster management, the framework described can be used 
in other risk situations encountered by the CWD commu-
nity. Hopefully this work will encourage managers to think 
about issues of risk and potential disruptions to their op-
erations. By thinking about these issues, organizations can 
better address them. Equally important is that the com-
munity openly discusses successes and failures from these 
experiences as well as shares experiences with others to in-
crease general knowledge and improve future efforts. 
See endnotes page 66
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An Overview of Mozambique’s 
Mine-free District Process 
by Antonio Belchior Vaz Martíns [ National Demining Institute of Mozambique ]  
and Hans Risser [ United Nations Development Programme, Mozambique ]
In the 1990s, Mozambique ranked among countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Iraq as one of the most mine- 
contaminated countries in the world. At the time, experts es-
timated that clearing all landmines in Mozambique would 
take 50 to 100 years. Landmines were widely used by all sides 
during the conflicts that ravaged Mozambique from the mid-
1960s until 1992. These nuisance minefields usually consisted 
of small numbers of mines in seemingly random or undefined 
areas mostly around paths, wells and rural infrastructure. 
Large-pattern minefields tended to be the exception rather than 
the norm in Mozambique. Given the widespread use of land-
mines and poorly defined minefields, how did the government 
and international partners identify and clear all mined areas 
in accordance with the country’s obligations under the Anti- 
personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)?
Article 5 Obligations
Article 5 of the APMBC states that “each State Party shall 
make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or 
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspect-
ed to be emplaced” and “to destroy or ensure the destruction 
of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdic-
tion or control, as soon as possible.”1 However, as with most 
laws, this text has been interpreted in several ways, leading 
some to believe the aim of the APMBC was to achieve a mine-
free, mine-impact free or mine-safe status. Yet, none of these 
previous terms actually appear in the text of the convention. 
Seeking to clarify the interpretation of Article 5’s intent, the 
state parties to the convention agreed that “the Convention 
does not contain language that would require each State Party 
to search every square meter of its territory to find mines.”2 
However, Article 5 does require that state parties make every 
effort to identify all mined areas under their jurisdiction or 
control, and clear those areas without delay.
In a country such as Mozambique, where mine contam-
ination was widespread and not in well-defined areas, what 
qualifies as every effort required to identify all known areas? 
The process of identifying all known confirmed and suspect-
ed hazard areas (SHAs) requires transparency and account-
ability to ensure that a reasonable effort is made to identify all 
areas, without aiming to clear every square meter of territory. 
In Mozambique’s case, the answer to this dilemma and the 
question of how much effort is enough became known as the 
Mine-free District (MFD) Process.
Mine-free District Process
From 1993 to 2007, The HALO Trust was the lead agen-
cy responsible for demining the four northern provinces 
of Mozambique (i.e. Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Numpula and 
Zambezia). As HALO approached the end of its task list in 
2004, it developed a district-wide survey concept, creating the 
necessary conditions for an end state and documentation as 
evidence that no further known mined areas existed in the 
districts within the four northern provinces. HALO called 
this district-wide assessment the Mine Impact Free District 
(MIFD) Survey, a comprehensive survey designed to be imple-
mented toward the end of a demining operator’s engagement 
in a country or geographical area.3 
The MIFD survey required survey teams to visit every 
community within the northern provinces to interview a 
cross section of the people who lived there and determine if 
they knew of any remaining mines or other explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW) threats. Any SHAs identified by the 
“... what qualifies as every effort 
required to identify all known areas? “
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communities required further technical survey and possibly 
clearance if the presence of mines or unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) was confirmed. In each district, at both the beginning 
and end of the process, district authorities were briefed on the 
findings. As a final step in the process, each community lead-
er and district official accompanying the HALO teams signed 
a report to acknowledge that as far as they were aware there 
were no more known mined areas in their respective districts 
or communities. All reports were carefully archived in both 
hard and soft formats. The results of the MIFD surveys were 
shared with the National Demining Institute (NDI) for their 
consideration and liaison with other governmental bodies.4 
According to the report submitted to the NDI, the MIFD sur-
vey teams visited 6,395 communities and interviewed 401,007 
people in the four northern provinces. Through the MIFD 
survey, 74 previously unknown SHAs were identified. HALO 
conducted technical survey and clearance in these 74 areas 
discovering and destroying a further 176 mines.5 
NDI recognized the MIFD survey concept as a useful means 
for operators to exert a reasonable amount of effort to identify 
all possible hazardous areas in a district. However, while the 
HALO Trust’s MIFD survey standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) became the SOPs outlining the responsibilities of the 
humanitarian demining operators in the process, NDI recog-
nized that the local government, district government and pro-
vincial governments also needed to be formally brought into 
the process to ensure that the approach could become more 
accountable and comprehensive.
The MFD Process adopted by the government became an 
integral part of its National Mine Action Plan and the dis-
trict-by-district approach that the government used to ensure 
all known SHAs in a district were completed before operators 
moved on to another district or area of operations. The gov-
ernment defined the term ‘mine free’ as the absence of any 
known mined areas or SHAs. In Mozambique, the term ‘mine 
free’ therefore does not rule out the possibility of unknown 
Local community leaders in Mozambique participate in a Mine Free District Survey.
Photo courtesy of Antonio Belchior Vaz Martíns, NDI.
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areas or even unknown landmines or other ERW.6 The MFD 
Process became a means to ensure the implementation of 
Article 5 obligations in Mozambique while recognizing the 
need to improve the visibility, transparency and recording of 
demining results in the country.
Implementation of the Mine-free  
District Process
Given this framework, the government established six 
main objectives for the MFD Process:
• First, ensure the beneficiary communities and the gov-
ernment structures at provincial and subordinate district 
levels were satisfied and confident in the demining op-
erators’ work due to the communities’ and governments’ 
direct involvement in the process of evaluating and vali-
dating the survey and clearance operations’ results.
• Second, through the MFD Process, the government 
hoped to eliminate any SHAs in the districts where 
clearance operations were completed or nearing 
completion.
• Third, the MFD Process aimed to formalize the official 
process for delivering completion reports on demined 
areas to the government structures at the provincial, 
district and local community levels.
• Fourth, by formally declaring completed districts mine 
free, the government promoted investment and imple-
mentation of socioeconomic development projects.
• Fifth, by taking a district-by-district approach, the 
government focused on demining efforts in districts 
still facing problems with landmines and other ERW 
while clearly defining those districts where the prob-
lem was resolved.
• Sixth, the government also aimed to establish sustain-
able mechanisms, in addition to NDI, for monitoring 
the national mine action program at the provincial, dis-
trict and local community levels.
The MFD Process consisted of four primary steps:
• First, complete demining operations in all con-
firmed hazardous areas (CHA) and SHAs at the dis-
trict level, and formally hand over those same areas 
to local communities for development and socio- 
economic activities.
• Second, evaluate all affected communities at the dis-
trict level to confirm the community’s level of satisfac-
tion with the results of demining operations, including 
confirming and documenting that, to the best of their 
knowledge, no additional SHAs remain in their local 
communities.
• Third, ensure the provincial government receives all 
necessary information on those districts within the 
province that qualified as mine free. 
• Finally, hold an official handover ceremony in which 
the demining-operation completion reports, maps and 
other pertinent data on all demining in the districts are 
given to the governmental authorities of the mine-free 
classified districts.
The primary tools utilized in the MFD Process include 
NDI’s guidelines for the classification of mine-free districts; 
demining reports—i.e., survey, area reduction, demining 
completion and quality-assurance (QA) reports—NDI’s pro-
cedures and SOPs for QA in Mozambique; the complete list of 
all administrative divisions in Mozambique; as well as the na-
tional mine action standards.
In order to implement the MFD Process, roles and respon-
sibilities were defined for four main actors or groups of actors 
at various administrative levels: 
• NDI and its QA teams represented the national authority. 
• The demining organizations were the primary imple-
menters at local and district levels. 
• The local government represented by the community 
authorities, town or settlement leaders; local police 
commanders; and the heads of local administrative 
posts were the primary beneficiary groups at the lo-
cal level. 
• Government administrators represented the provincial 
and district levels. 
The various actors’ responsibilities and actions are out-
lined here:
NDI and QA teams
• Coordinated, monitored and supervised the MFD 
Process and classification of districts as mine free.
• Validated the results of the demining operations and 
assured handover of demined areas to communities 
“The government of Moz ambique is under no illusions  
that a residual risk remains of finding previously  
unknown ERW or even landmines...”
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and government structures at the district level to initi-
ate socioeconomic activities.
• Provided information to the provincial govern-
ments on the districts that can be formally classi-
fied as mine free.
• Produced a final report on the conclusion of all demin-
ing operations in the districts classified as mine free.
• Coordinated and organized public ceremonies mark-
ing the official delivery of all demining completion 
reports to the government structures of the districts 
classified as mine free.
The humanitarian demining operators
• Conducted demining operations on all assigned areas 
at the district level and ensured that survey teams vis-
ited all communities (including formal and informal 
settlements). The demining operator’s survey teams in-
terviewed the local communities to determine and re-
cord the presence or absence of any suspected areas in 
their vicinity.
• Provided all reports on demining operations conducted 
in the districts to NDI, thus reinforcing what national 
mine action standards already require.
• Supported and participated jointly with NDI QA teams in 
the formal handover of all cleared areas to the local com-
munities and government structures at the district level.
• Conducted the official handover in coordination with 
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Mozambique, 2008
Yellow: District without landmine contamination
Red: District with landmine contamination
All maps courtesy of IMSMA/CISR.
Mozambique, 2010
Green: District free of mines
Yellow: District in final phase of demining activity
Red: District with hazardous areas to be cleared following year
Moz ambique’s Mine-free District Process
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Mozambique, 2012
Green: District free of mines
Yellow: District in final phase of demining activity
Red: District with hazardous area to be cleared following year
Mozambique, January 2015 
Green: District free of mines
Yellow: District nearing completion
20 12 20 15
NDI of all completion reports for demining operations 
in the district to government authorities in districts 
classified as mine free.
The local community authorities, district governments and 
provincial government through its appointed representatives
• Supported data collection on CHAs and SHAs in their 
respective areas.
• Participated in the evaluation and validation of demining 
operations conducted by NDI and demining operators.
• Shared responsibility for ensuring that communities in 
the districts classified as mine free were satisfied with 
the results of the demining operations.
• Supported NDI and demining operators in organizing 
the official ceremonies for the handover of demining 
completion reports to the government structures of the 
mine-free districts.
• Archived and filed (for public and other local govern-
ment institutions to consult in the future) all of the 
comprehensive conclusion report of demining opera-
tions in the district prepared by NDI, and the comple-
tion reports from all demining operators in the district.
• Shared information on the results and impact of dem-
ining operations in their respective areas among gov-
ernment structures and development and cooperation 
partners, as well as other relevant authorities at national 
and international levels.
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Benefits and Results of the MFD Process  
in Mozambique
Implementation of the MFD Process in Mozambique re-
sulted in clear advantages and benefits to the overall nation-
al mine action program in Mozambique. The process allowed 
better management of the overall mine-contamination prob-
lem in Mozambique with progress tracked clearly in the status 
of each individual district. In the absence of written infor-
mation from former combatants, documentary evidence or 
military maps with data on mine contamination, the local 
communities became the most reliable source for information 
on mine contamination. Moreover, many former combatants 
with relevant information on mine contamination could be 
found and interviewed in the local communities. Thus, the in-
teraction and survey process of all local communities within 
a district provided a means for the government and national 
mine action program to exert all reasonable effort to identify 
and clear all known mined areas in a manner meeting the ob-
ligations of the APMBC’s Article 5. Another clear advantage 
of the MFD Process was the documentation generated with 
formal signatures required from NDI QA teams, local com-
munity leaders, police commanders and demining operators. 
The paper trail generated by the process allows for a trans-
parent and accountable manner of ensuring that all known 
mined areas in each district were identified and cleared, re-
moving the need to search every square meter of its territory.
While the process itself may be misunderstood due to its 
use of the term mine free, the government clearly defined 
the term in its national context: A mine-free district no lon-
ger contains any known CHAs or SHAs, and is supported by 
An NDI QA officer checks coordinates of a survey report for a 
suspected hazardous area.
Photo courtesy of Antonio Belchior Vaz Martíns, NDI.
documentation with signatures from each community in the 
district that they are satisfied with the results. The govern-
ment of Mozambique is under no illusions that a residual risk 
remains of finding previously unknown ERW or even land-
mines, and is taking appropriate action to prepare a sustain-
able national capacity for such an eventuality. The ultimate 
success of the process is Mozambique’s formal declaration in 
2015 of compliance with Article 5 of the APMBC. Hopefully 
mine-affected states in similar situations will find these les-
sons learned from Mozambique useful. 
See endnotes page 67
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Transition and National Capacity 
After Article 5 Compliance
by Hans Risser [ United Nations Development Programme, Mozambique ] 
and Christian Ruge [ Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource ]
In June 2014, State Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) met in Maputo, Mozambique, for the 3rd Review Conference of the 
APMBC, fifteen years after its entry into force. As the review 
conference approached, State Parties faced a growing call from 
civil society and some State Parties to commit to complete all 
obligations in the treaty as rapidly as possible. The majority 
of State Parties have already completed their APBMC obli-
gations to destroy stockpiles of anti-personnel (AP) mines. 
However, surveying and clearing all known mined areas in a 
state’s territory in accordance with obligations under Article 
5 of the treaty is no easy task. Considerable progress has been 
made, and some states with moderate to heavy contamination 
are moving toward an end state. In 2015, Mozambique com-
pleted demining of all known minefields after approximately 
20 years of survey and mine clearance efforts.1 
As more states approach com-
pletion, governments and mine 
action stakeholders should con-
sider certain issues that arise as 
a consequence. Completion of 
Article 5 obligations is a major 
achievement for mine-affected 
countries but does not mark the 
final conclusion of clearance in 
their country. 
As leader of the Third Review 
Conference, Mozambique facil-
itated a discussion during the 
Review Conference and at a sub-
sequent regional meeting on how 
to prepare for the transition from 
Article 5 clearance to longer- 
term operations that address re-
sidual explosive remnants of 
war (ERW). The objective was to 
identify policy recommendations that may be considered by 
States Parties to the convention. 
The discussion focused on the following questions: * How do national authorities ensure optimal productiv-
ity up until the completion date? * How can national authorities assist deminers in finding 
other employment opportunities following the comple-
tion of all demining tasks?* How should national authorities prepare their mine ac-
tion coordination structures and demining staff for the 
post-completion situation?* How do national authorities retain key operational per-
sonnel throughout closing and quality control opera-
tions and ensure proper documentation of efforts is 
available for future use?
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Figure 1. Belgium: Annual ERW response
All figures courtesy of GICHD’s Management of Residual ERW Project.
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* After Article 5 completion, how will national authori-
ties identify and manage the hazards and risks posed 
by residual ERW?* After Article 5 completion, what will happen to the na-
tional mine action database and will clearance records 
be utilized and updated to manage information on any 
residual ERW accidents and clearance activities?
This article reviews some of the challenges that State 
Parties to the APMBC face in completing their obligations to 
clear all known mined areas, as well as what can be done with 
the national mine action capacity after completion and what is 
needed in the future to respond to the inevitable residual ERW 
contamination. The case of Mozambique provides an example 
of how State Parties and their international partners can pre-
pare for the challenges of completion and plan for the transi-
tion of their national mine action capacity.
ERW Contamination: 
Not Always a Humanitarian Crisis
Most states that have experienced sustained armed conflict 
over the last century will have some sort of explosive ordnance 
problem that needs to be addressed in a rational, transparent 
and systematic manner. Experience from Europe and other 
parts of the world that still contain areas contaminated with 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) dating back to both World 
War I and World War II indicates that this is a problem that 
requires a sustainable, long-term national response. 
Immediately after a conflict, ERW contamination poses a 
serious humanitarian problem and hinders recovery efforts. 
In such cases, proactive survey and clearance operations led 
or assisted by international partners are necessary. Despite the 
best and most thorough clearance operations, a small residual 
risk will remain, and a missed mine, 
piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
or previously unknown suspected haz-
ardous areas (SHA) could be identified. 
However minor the risk, residual ERW 
contamination constitutes a certain se-
curity and safety risk to the population, 
and it may hamper and significantly 
increase the cost of infrastructure de-
velopment. Explosive ordnance may 
also be a source of explosive materials 
for groups and individuals involved in 
criminal activities. It is thus a situation 
that needs to be addressed by the state, 
as part of its responsibility to uphold 
the law, provide security and facilitate 
development. A sustainable, national capacity is required to 
identify the risk from any residual ERW and manage the haz-
ards posed to the population.
In order to prepare for this, many current mine-affected 
states need to consider how to transition from having a dedi-
cated mine action center to establishing a sustainable explo-
sive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity. 
Addressing Residual ERW Problems
Addressing long-term ERW contamination requires a dif-
ferent approach and capacity than addressing mined areas. 
Mine clearance under Article 5 is essentially a proactive pro-
cess involving relatively large numbers of survey and demin-
ing teams that are often supported by international technical 
advisors and financial assistance. Addressing the long-term 
ERW problem in most states would entail a reactive process 
involving a smaller, more sustainable national capacity, where 
threats are identified by civilians and cleared by personnel. 
The process requires different timelines as opposed to the five-
to 10-year cycles provided by the APMBC. With little or no 
realistic baseline against which progress may be assessed, it is 
typically impossible to define a definite endpoint. 
Most states need a robust, reactive system for reporting, re-
cording and responding to explosive ordnance that is designed 
to function in a sustainable manner in the long term. However, 
the expertise necessary to set up and maintain a reporting and 
recording system that is trusted by the general public and all 
relevant stakeholders differs from the expertise necessary to 
identify and render safe an unexploded bomb or grenade. 
Governments need to identify what role, if any, current mine 
action coordination structures should have in the transition 
and post-completion scenarios. Preparing for the transition to 
1589
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Figure 2. Japan: Annual ERW Response.
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a post-completion scenario will ensure 
State Parties have a sustainable capac-
ity to report and address the discovery 
of any previously unknown mined areas 
that may eventually be discovered after 
reporting compliance with Article 5. 
Preparing for Completion 
and Transition
National authorities approach-
ing completion of Article 5 obligations 
would benefit from simultaneous-
ly preparing for both completion and 
transition within the same strategic 
framework. In doing so, one could look 
at the Article 5 deadline as an important 
milestone or transition point in a long-
term exercise that aims at maintaining 
a rational and effective response to the 
problem of explosive ordnance. 
Achieving compliance is a major ac-
complishment in itself. However, main-
taining the motivation and technical 
capacity required to ensure the demin-
ing is completed within the timeline set 
by the country’s Article 5 obligations 
is one of the challenges. Previous ex-
perience shows that productivity rates 
among deminers tend to decrease as 
they approach the end of demining op-
erations. Knowing that they are work-
ing toward their own unemployment, 
deminers may be tempted to extend de-
mining tasks for as long as possible for their own economic 
self-preservation. The situation may be further complicated 
when mine-affected communities benefit economically from 
the presence of demining teams (e.g., employment of local 
people or the provision of services to demining teams) creat-
ing an incentive to report clear areas as having mine contami-
nation. Designing incentives and rewards to keep deminers 
and quality assurance inspectors motivated, honest and pro-
ductive until the end is an important issue to ensure demining 
does not fall behind schedule. Restructuring and retraining 
programs that assist deminers’ transition to new employment 
opportunities following the completion of demining tasks 
could also be a means to keep deminers motivated. 
In the case of Mozambique, deminers maintained high mo-
rale and remained motivated through organized completion 
ceremonies for each province, with special recognition given 
to the deminers involved. The government also encouraged 
demining operators to incorporate retraining and education 
programs as well as severance packages for the deminers into 
the operator’s annual budget. Critically, the Mozambique gov-
ernment also discussed the situation with donors and encour-
aged development partners to support deminers’ retraining 
and education.
Mine affected states could benefit from reviewing their 
current resources, such as their technical staff, and determin-
ing how said resources could be used to support long-term 
efforts. Considering how national and international actors 
have invested in building national mine action coordination 
structures, it is worth understanding how these capacities 
can be repurposed for future use by the national authorities. 
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Figure 3. Berlin: Annual disposal of unexploded ordnance in metric tons 1947-2011.
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By creating a viable transition plan for 
mine action structures before all dem-
ining tasks are completed, national au-
thorities can retain skilled employees 
and national capacities. 
When transitioning from large-
scale, internationally-supported de-
mining capacities to smaller, nation-
ally-led, post-completion capacities, 
national mine action authorities should 
review and map their capacities and the 
roles of their mine action centers. To 
use these capacities effectively, nation-
al authorities should compare the abili-
ties of their centers to national legisla-
tion on disaster management and the 
control of the civilian explosives indus-
try (i.e., the production, transportation, 
sale, storage and licensing of commer-
cial operators). Maintaining records of 
clearance operations will be integral 
for future construction projects as well 
as clarifying any liability issues in case 
of future accidents. For many mine- 
affected countries, demining organi-
zations in the field respond to regular 
reports from civilians for EOD spot 
tasks to remove explosive items as part of their normal mine 
action duties. Following Article 5 completion, a sustainable 
national capacity (e.g., police, military or civilian protection 
forces) should be trained to assume this role and the civilian 
population informed on how to report suspicious items.
As an example, a transition plan for post-completion na-
tional capacity may include the need to:1 . Train police, military or civilian protection forces to 
conduct small, EOD spot tasks and accident investiga-
tions as an emergency response for public safety 2. Maintain a national database with information publi-
cally available for liability issues and future construc-
tion projects that may require digging below the depth 
of clearance established by the national mine action 
standard in previously contaminated areas 3. Quality assurance or quality control in EOD or mine 
action related activities to control the implementation 
of national legislation on the production, transport 
and use of explosives in the civilian commercial sector4. Licensing and contracting authority for either com-
mercial entities or nongovernmental organizations to 
conduct future EOD spot tasks as required for residu-
al ERW or clearance operations in a larger area if pre-
viously unknown mined areas are discovered 5. Provide advisory services to private investors and 
planning units or project management units in the 
ministries on how to arrange for any risk reduction 
and verification services (from local/regional firms or 
NGOs) that might be required for future private or 
public development projects
In Mozambique, the aforementioned issues were con-
sidered. With the assistance of the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a transitional 
strategy was drafted for the management of ERW. This plan 
called for the transition of the Mozambique Mine Action 
Centre into a training facility, which will be used to equip and 
train police officers in basic EOD in each province. The na-
tional database and all mine clearance records will be handed 
over to the national authority that manages the land where it 
will be maintained and used by anyone seeking to build or de-
velop the area. 
Trainers from the Mozambique National Demining Institute and U.S. AFRICOM conduct 
EOD training in Inhambane Province, Mozambique (September 2015).
Photo courtesy of the Mozambique National Demining Institute
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Starting in 2014, the National Demining Institute part-
nered with the U.S. military’s AFRICOM to train and equip 
a team of Mozambican trainers, who would later train pro-
vincial police officers in ERW identification, risk analysis and 
basic level 1 explosive ordnance disposal. AFRICOM and the 
Mozambique National Demining Institute developed a core 
curriculum and began training police officers, with an aim 
to have a small team of police trained and equipped in each 
province to manage residual ERW after the demining opera-
tors completed the survey and clearance of all known mined 
areas. With the support of AFRICOM and UNDP, trainers 
from the National Demining Institute successfully trained 
and equipped more than 124 police officers across all of the 
country’s 10 provinces by the end of 2015. 
Donors to mine clearance efforts may also benefit from 
considering how to structure their support in a way that fa-
cilitates efficient and effective resource use while retaining 
the national capacities established with their support. In the 
case of Mozambique, the National Demining Institute and in-
ternational demining operators began discussing transition 
plans and retraining of deminers early on. This focus on the 
transition process secured the support of some donors and the 
critical funding for these long-term transitional efforts. 
Structuring international support for this transition peri-
od may address claims by previously mine-affected State 
Parties that financial assistance to address UXO and ERW is-
sues stopped immediately after declaration of Article 5 com-
pliance. While Article 5 compliance may signal the end of 
active demining operations, international support and assis-
tance can and should be used for the establishment of a sus-
tainable national capacity that shifts its focus to other ERW 
priorities such as a response to residual UXO, explosive stor-
age stockpile management or the clearance of other areas con-
taminated by ERW other than landmines. 
See endnotes page 57
Elements of this paper were originally introduced as a dis-
cussion paper to the Third Review Conference of the APMBC 
held in Maputo in 2014. 
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Field Notes
TIRAMISU Final Technology 
Demonstration at SEDEE-DOVO
By Yann Yvinec, Ph.D., Vinciane Lacroix, Ph.D. and Yvan Baudoin, Ph.D. [ Royal Military Academy of Belgium ]
On 24 September 2015, and in the presence of Her Royal Highness Princess Astrid of Belgium, the Royal Military Academy of Belgium (RMA) orga-
nized a demonstration for mine action tools in Meerdael, 
Belgium. At the Belgian EOD battalion premises of SEDEE-
DOVO, RMA presented technology developed under the 
TIRAMISU project, which was co-funded by the European 
Union and coordinated by RMA.1 Designed by twenty-six 
different organizations, the tools covered multiple elements 
of mine action, including survey, operation and valida-
tion, information management, mine risk education (MRE), 
close-in-detection, and personnel protective equipment 
(PPE). Organizers held inside and outside demonstrations 
as well as discussions of the tools developed throughout the 
four-year project.
Outdoor demonstrations involved several pieces of me-
chanical equipment with mounted detectors, including a 
remotely-controlled vehicle with a multi-channel metal detec-
tor; an agriculture tractor-based vehicle with a ground pen-
etrating radar and blast resistant wheels; a small autonomous 
robot with a rotating metal detector; and a vehicle-mounted, 
side-looking radar.2,3
Organizers also presented geospatial tools based on open-
source information and earth-observational data. Visibility and 
trafficability analyses demonstrated utility for the areas of battle 
reconstruction, vulnerability estimation and mine action cam-
paign planning. A prioritization tool was demonstrated using a 
case study from Cambodia, while a case study from Croatia dem-
onstrated how satellite data, airborne surveys and drones can as-
sist in determining the presence or absence of mine indicators. 
A few of the products demonstrated include the TIRAMISU drone, which provides 3D mapping capabilities, and the TIRAMISAR (in 
the background on the right), a side-looking imaging sensor with ground penetrating radar.
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After floods struck Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014, a 
drone capable of building a three-dimensional representation 
of terrain assisted with search and rescue operations, and was 
used to identify locations where floods could have displaced 
landmines.4 This technology was demonstrated at SEDEE-
DOVO. The combination of the three-dimensionally generated 
relief and aerial data was recognized as a valuable tool for 
surveyors, and a guide on “Geoinformation for demining” 
is available on the TIRAMISU website, listing products’ 
availability and capabilities.2
Relating to data collection during surveys, SPINATOR 
developed a tablet application called TIRAMISU Information 
Management System (T-IMS), which ensures data are collected 
correctly with GPS coordinates and are easily compatible with 
other systems. Alternatively, proTime 
and DIALOGIS designed a set of 
communication boxes to create a Wi-
Fi mesh where GPS coordinates and 
data can be transferred in the absence 
of an Internet connection. These boxes 
can be mounted on mobile equipment, 
together with a metal detector, in order 
to gather data and record its position. 
The event demonstrated two meth-
ods for mine risk education (MRE). 
Snail Aid exhibited a modular and 
highly-adaptable theater play that is 
broadcast via radio and was evaluated 
in Algeria and Cambodia.5 Additional-
ly, the Institute of Mathematical Mach- 
ines presented an electronic board game 
that teaches children MRE safety mes-
sages to mitigate the everyday dangers 
of landmines. 
The Spanish National Research 
Council (CSIC) demonstrated new 
methods for training that involved 
the implementation of detectors and 
prodders for deminers as well as vir-
tual reality applications for operators 
of remotely-controlled vehicles. The 
University of St. Andrews (U.K.) in-
troduced an explosives detector vapor 
that can be used together with the Re-
mote Explosive Scent Tracing (REST) 
survey method. 
The Military Institute of Technical 
Engineering (WITI) showcased a blast-
resistant container designed to transport hazardous items 
to disposal areas. The container was tested extensively to 
evaluate its resistance in case of an unwanted explosion. 
WITI also demonstrated new techniques to dispose of 
explosives that involved the physical destruction of the fuse 
using hexogen charges. 
While most PPE is currently tested against several 
consecutive impacts, equipment can sustain far worse 
damage when multiple impacts occur simultaneously. To test 
equipment against this kind of threat, RMA designed a piece 
of equipment with three adjacent barrels that can shoot three 
projectiles almost simultaneously at a test object. Attendees had 
the opportunity to view a film depicting the triple-launcher at 
work in the RMA ballistic lab.
The arm of the remotely operated Semi-autonomous Demining Robot Husky-ISR/
UC carries a triple coil metal detector, and the robot carries a sensor payload com-
posed of video cameras, a 3D laser range finder, an inertial measuring unit and a 
GPS receiver.
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Other fundamental research included the use of honey bees 
to detect explosives developed by the University of Zagreb 
(Croatia) and the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) 
Centre for Testing, Development and Training (CTDT), 
and a smart prodder developed by the University of Catania 
(Italy) that can identify the type of material detected. Other 
developments include innovations in ground penetrating radar 
technology, metal detection and GIS mapping capabilities.
Conclusion
The objective of the TIRAMISU project is to provide the 
mine action community with a multi-functional toolbox that 
can assist in addressing the many issues related to humani-
tarian demining. Twenty-six partners collaborated over four 
years (starting in 2012) to build the best tools Europe can offer 
to make mine and unexploded ordnance clearance safer and 
more efficient. 
For more detailed information on the technology featured 
at SEDEE-DOVO, please view the online version of this article 
at http://www.jmu.edu/cisr, or visit the TIRAMISU website at 
http://www.fp7-tiramisu.eu. 
See endnotes page 67
Haris Balta of the Belgian RMA prepares the Teodor V-Metal 
Detector D Array for a field demonstration.
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The Research and Development section is funded by the 
U.S. Department of Defense, 
Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence (UXOCOE)
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SMALL CALIBER DE-ARMERS: AN ANSWER 
TO EXPLOSIVE ACQUISITION PROBLEMS
by Harold S. Pearson [ Development Technology Workshop ]
In many mine-affected countries, sourcing, transporting and reliably initiating explosives is one of the major obstacles for mine action operators. Consequently, finding a reliable 
method of destroying anti-personnel (AP) landmines and other 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination that does not 
require the use of high explosives is of great interest to many in 
the industry.
While .50-caliber de-armers and disruptors are widely used 
in the world of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), their use in 
landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance is less com-
mon. Both de-armers and disruptors function by firing projectiles 
at ERW items. Whereas a de-armer uses a steel slug as the pro-
jectile, a disruptor uses the projectile motion of a water jet. These 
tools use de-bulleted and re-loaded cartridges fitted with electric 
matches that are loaded into a breech with the breech cap tight-
ened down. A de-armer consists of a slug that is loaded into the 
threaded end of a barrel, which is then screwed onto a breech. 
Alternatively, a disruptor consists of a plastic slug that is loaded 
into the threaded end of a barrel, acting as a seal, as the barrel 
Breakdown of the mini de-armer. From left to right: breech cap, 
de-bulleted 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge, breech, 14 mm steel slug, and 
barrel.
is screwed onto a breech. The dis-
ruptor is then positioned vertically, 
and water is poured into the barrel 
to within 10 mm of the top, which 
is then sealed with a close-fitting 
polystyrene plug. 
De-armers and disruptors are 
positioned so that their barrels 
are within 25 mm of their targets. 
Both are initiated via an electric ca-
ble that is connected to a standard 
electronic blasting machine (i.e., 
an electric power source for initi-
ating the detonation) that is a safe 
distance away as designated by the 
on-site EOD officer. The machine 
then sends a current to the electric 
match inside the cartridge, caus-
ing the cartridge to fire and pro-
pel the steel slug or water jet toward 
the target at a high velocity, de-arming 
or disrupting the firing chain, usually 
without initiating the main charge within the munitions or ex-
plosive device. It is the responsibility of the on-site EOD officer to 
decide whether the UXO can be moved safely, and whether the ex-
plosive charge can be removed for disposal. 
Many operators find that in addition to their cost, the power 
cartridges used by these tools are often expensive and problemat-
ic to move due to restrictions on the transportation and importa-
tion of explosives. However, these challenges led The HALO Trust 
to pursue a collaborative project with Development Technology 
Workshop (DTW) to develop alternative clearance methods that 
could use locally sourced ammunition. 
The DTW created a series of EOD tools and produced equip-
ment for the following calibers: 7.62 x 39 mm, 12.7 x 108 mm, 14.5 
x 114 mm (Russian) and 12.7 x 99 mm NATO. More than 80 of 
Complete Mini De-Armer with de-bulleting kit, reloading kit and tool roll.
All graphics courtesy of author.
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these tools were deployed in the field against live AP and anti-tank 
(AT) landmines and were used to remove fuzes from larger UXO 
safely for subsequent transport and disposal elsewhere. DTW also 
developed a rocket wrench (12.7 x 108 mm), nine of which were 
deployed. These use a pair of charges to unscrew the fuze from 
large UXO items (bombs and shells).
LOCALLY MANUFACTURED AMMUNITION
In the United Kingdom and United States, the high cost of a 
standard, commercial .50-caliber power cartridge (custom-made 
for de-armers) is one of the main deterrents to using disruptors for 
routine minefield demolitions. However, small-arms ammunition 
cartridges are widely available and much more affordable in many 
of the countries where demining takes place. DTW has developed 
de-bulleting kits that allow the use of ammunition manufactured 
or sourced in country, greatly reducing the costs of shipping and 
transportation. 
These de-bulleting kits are supplied with each of their EOD 
de-armers/disruptors and require locally sourced ammuni-
tion and an electric match. The electric matches cost a mere 30 
cents each, and an air courier can ship them as a normal package. 
Moreover, any standard electronic blasting machine can initiate 
these matches.
The de-bulleting process is straightforward and can be com-
pleted in five minutes. First, the bullet is pulled from the car-
tridge, and the propellant is poured into a container. Next, the 
percussion cap is struck and its brass housing removed. Then the 
electric match is inserted with its wires exiting through the hole 
where the percussion cap was originally. Thereafter the powder is 
poured back into the cartridge, which is crimped. Combined de- 
bulleting and crimping equipment is available and can be mount-
ed on workshop benches to speed up the process considerably.1 
HALO in Afghanistan now routinely uses the 12.7 x 108 mm 
disruptors to destroy AP mines in a role endorsed by the Mine 
Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan. The use of de- 
bulleted cartridges avoids the need for demining personnel to 
transport explosives and detonators through areas with possi-
ble Taliban checkpoints, preventing the chance of diverting ex-
plosives into the wrong hands. Similarly, the devices were used in 
Cambodia to destroy mines along the Thai border, and negated 
the need to cause explosions in sensitive areas where the military 
and the local population prohibited the use of explosives.
PERFORMANCE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINI DE-ARMER
The 12.7 x 108 mm disruptor is an efficient tool, but engineers 
at DTW felt these cartridges were excessive when used to destroy 
plastic-bodied AP mines and de-arm other small ordnance such 
as 60 mm mortar bombs. The engineers believed they could har-
ness sufficient power to destroy standard AP mines from a smaller 
cartridge. To this end, they experimented with the ubiquitous 7.62 
x 39 mm round (the cartridge used by the AK-47).
Trial results on an indoor test range showed that a 14 mm steel 
slug driven by a de-bulleted 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge using the 
Mine De-Armer could penetrate a 4 mm mild steel witness plate. 
De-bulleted and re-loaded cartridges for three sizes of Mini De- 
Armers developed by DTW. From left to right: 7.62 x 39 mm, 12.7 x 
108 mm (also available in 12.7 x 99 mm NATO), and 14.5 x 114 mm 
(Russian).
A strike on a 60 mm mortar fuze with a 14 mm steel slug.
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Figure 1 (left to right). Hard plastic 16 mm slug, 14 mm steel flat end, and chisel slug.
Figure 2. Mini De-Armer set up to destroy a PMN AP mine using the 
16 mm, 2.4 g plastic slug. Note that a sandbag is placed on top of 
the tool before firing to dampen the recoil.
Figure 3. As a result of the strike, many parts of the mine were 
unrecoverable. 
Figure 4. Mini De-Armer set up to destroy a PMN2 AP mine using a 
14 mm, 27.2 g steel slug.
Figure 5. Result of the strike on the PMN2 with the 14mm steel 
slug.
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Further experiments using a 16 mm hard plastic slug soon showed 
that the plastic slug was sufficiently energetic to destroy a range 
of plastic AP mines (including PMN, PMN2 and Type 72 mines). 
By using a plastic slug, engineers limit the amount of metal con-
tamination to the surrounding area. Tests using a water projec-
tile as described above were also conducted but showed that water 
added little extra value to the effect of the plastic slug in attack-
ing AP mines. This contrasts with the larger 12.7 x 108 mm dis-
ruptor, which has proved very effective when used with the water 
projectile.
Trials of the 7.62 mm Mine De-Armer continue in Cambodia, 
but the system is capable of destroying most plastic AP mines. Field 
testing utilized a 14 mm diameter steel slug weighing 27.2 g with 
a barrel length of 135 mm and a 16 mm diameter hard plastic slug 
weighing 2.4 g with a barrel length of 175 mm. DTW engineers 
recognized that performance was dependent upon several factors:
1. Barrel length
2. Burn rate of the propellant, which depends on the grain 
size and is fixed by the reuse of existing propellant in 
this case
3. Projectile dimensions, including weight and diameter
4. Projectile fit to barrel; a tighter fit will result in a higher 
pressure buildup of propellant gasses and a higher velocity
5. Size of the charge, which is fixed by the size of the AK-
47 cartridge.
Of these five factors, barrel length, projectile dimension and 
projectile fit were most easily modified, and hence offered the best 
opportunities for improving performance.
Based on the field test results, DTW decided to carry out bal-
listic testing using a chronograph on an indoor range in order to 
determine optimal dimensions for projectiles and barrels. The in-
formation in Table 1 relates specifically to the Mine De-Armer as 
part of DTW’s research and development, and is not a guide for 
the energy required for the destruction of UXO. The plastic slug 
is made to be a tight fit and can be inserted by pushing it into the 
breech end of the barrel.
CONCLUSION
The results indicate the importance of barrel length when con-
sidering maximum output possibilities. Research and develop-
ment will continue, but the current design of the Mine De-Armer 
destroys plastic-bodied AP mines and removes Bakelite fuzes 
from small mortar bombs. Furthermore, the current design is also 
suitable for use against improvised explosive devices.
The Mine De-Armer is a lightweight (3 kg), easily transport-
able system for use against lighter munitions. The use of de-
armers and disruptors is a safe, economic way of rendering 
landmines and UXO of various kinds safe. All the equipment 
mentioned is cost-effective, especially in light of the limited 
budgets of many of the organizations involved in humanitarian 
clearance. Moreover, since the items are manufactured and ex-
ported directly from Cambodia, there are no delays associated 
with export license applications. 
See endnotes page 67
Development Technology Workshop is a British-registered 
charity and an international nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) based in Cambodia that provides research, development, 
prototyping, and when required, manufacturing services to other 
NGOs and the local, private-sector industry. DTW is not a demin-
ing organization.
Barrel length Slug length Slug diameter Slug weight Velocity kj energy
70mm 16mm 16mm 2.4g 43m/s 0.0022kj
170mm 16mm 16mm 2.4g 54m/s 0.0034kj
250mm 16mm 16mm 2.4g 64m/s 0.0049kj
 Table 1. K.E = ½mv2, where m = mass; v = velocity
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